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SmartResilience Project  
Modern critical infrastructures are becoming increasingly smarter (e.g. the smart cities). Making the infrastructures 
smarter usually means making them smarter in the normal operation and use: more adaptive, more intelligent etc. But 
will these smart critical infrastructures (SCIs) behave smartly and be smartly resilient also when exposed to extreme 
threats, such as extreme weather disasters or terrorist attacks? If making existing infrastructure smarter is achieved by 
making it more complex, would it also make it more vulnerable? Would this affect resilience of an SCI as its ability to 
anticipate, prepare for, adapt and withstand, respond to, and recover? What are the resilience indicators (RIs) which one 
has to look at? 
These are the main questions tackled by SmartResilience project. 
The project envisages answering the above questions in several steps (#1) By identifying existing indicators suitable for 
assessing resilience of SCIs (#2) By identifying new smart resilience indicators including those from Big Data (#3) By 
developing, a new advanced resilience assessment methodology based on smart RIs and the resilience indicators cube, 
including the resilience matrix (#4) By developing the interactive SCI Dashboard tool (#5) By applying the 
methodology/tools in 8 case studies, integrated under one virtual, smart-city-like, European case study. The SCIs 
considered (in 8 European countries!) deal with energy, transportation, health, and water. 
This approach will allow benchmarking the best-practice solutions and identifying the early warnings, improving 
resilience of SCIs against new threats and cascading and ripple effects. The benefits/savings to be achieved by the project 
will be assessed by the reinsurance company participant. The consortium involves seven leading end-users/industries in 
the area, seven leading research organizations, supported by academia and lead by a dedicated European organization. 
External world leading resilience experts will be included in the Advisory Board. 
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Executive Summary 
This report discusses contextual factors that need to be considered when conducting an 
indicator-based resilience assessment of smart critical infrastructures (SCIs). It includes legal 
issues, organizational requirements, as well as ethical considerations.  
The analysis of context factors has been part of WP3 “The SmartResilience Indicator-based 
methodology for assessing, predicting & monitoring the resilience of SCIs for optimized multi-
criteria decision making”. It sets a frame, and provides information on possible constraints 
when applying the methodology. The target audience are operators of SCIs and associated 
stakeholders. Results documented in this report also feed into the guideline as developed in 
T3.6. 
The legal factors firstly concern those that oblige stakeholders to assess resilience of SCIs, 
and/ or to maintain a certain level of resilience. One of the basic EU Directives is the “Directive 
2008/114/EC – identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and 
assessment of the need to improve their protection”. A transfer of relevant EU Directives into 
national law is exemplified using the fields of energy supply in Germany and drinking water 
supply in Sweden. Complementing these legal acts, selected support regarding their 
implementation, especially in terms of guidelines (on national level, plus e.g. ANSI/ API; OECD) 
is described. 
The legal factors secondly concern those that can hinder (or support) an assessment of 
resilience and/ or measures to increase resilience. Main issue here is data protection. On EU 
level, the current legal framework of data protection is manifested in Directive 95/46/EC of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data. Member States have implemented it into national 
data protections laws. However, as a response to challenges from the digital age, a 
comprehensive reform of data protection rules in the EU will become active in May 2018. It 
comprises a Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 – protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data) and a Directive 
(Directive (EU) 2016/680 – protecting individuals with regard to the processing of their 
personal data by police and criminal justice authorities, and on the free movement of such 
data). 
Both the assessment of resilience and the implementation of measures to increase resilience 
can only be successful if certain organizational requirements are fulfilled. The identified 
factors can be classified into “staff/ work process”; “tools”; “cooperation”; and “others”. 
Finally, possible ethical impacts of indicator-based resilience assessment can be described by 
phases – the pre-research phase, research phase, and application phase. The examination of 
respective quality criteria (such as validity, reliability, objectivity, etc.) for each indicator 
provides a basis for the selection of indicators and their interpretation. 
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 Introduction  
The development of an indicator-based resilience assessment method for smart critical infrastructures (SCIs) 
needs to take into account any contextual factors, e.g. legal issues, organizational requirements, and ethical 
considerations, in order to be successful. A lack of engagement with these issues may impede the eventual 
use of the indicators: they may not get used because laws prohibit necessary data acquisition; organizations 
are unable to use the indicators due to lack of personnel or because they are unable to translate the findings 
from the indicators into organizational changes, or the public actively works against the measures that are in 
place in order to collect data (e.g. resistance to surveillance cameras).  
Regarding the question, in how far the resilience approach is reflected in the legal and regulatory regimes, it 
has been found that characteristics of resilience related to “persistence” are quite well addressed by legal 
systems, while others such as adaptability or transformation are not accounted for in many cases [11] [18]. 
One explanation for this limited inclusion is that many laws neither sufficiently consider local differences nor 
allow for reactions to changing circumstances [18]. This report provides an overview in chapter 2 on existing 
legal acts that oblige stakeholders to assess resilience and to maintain a certain level of resilience of SCI. In 
addition, it identifies supporting tools that assist stakeholders to fulfil their obligations. The deliverable has 
put a specific focus on two case studies: Energy infrastructure in Germany, and water supply in Sweden, 
since the number of legal documents and acts that pertain to a single SCI in a country is quite substantial. 
The amount and variety of supporting documents is even more extensive, thus, the section on guidelines and 
other support documentation lists the most relevant ones, which have been directly mentioned by 
stakeholders. 
The report will not only provide a basis for the respective cases, but also serve as examples on how to 
investigate respective legal acts and supporting documents also for other SCI and for other countries. 
Of course, legal acts do not only play a role in this context because they oblige stakeholders to address 
resilience. They can also influence the success of actions to assess or to increase resilience (“external 
influencing factors”). In this context, especially the data protection legal framework is important, which is 
summarized in chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 then addresses the question of how organizational preconditions (“internal influencing factors”), 
such as available expertise, training, collaboration traditions, available tools, and others influence the success 
of resilience measures. 
Finally, chapter 5 addresses the issue of ethics. Specifically, what are possible unintentional consequences 
that the development and use of indicators can have? And how can these issues be addressed beforehand 
and possible negative results mitigated? 
The data in this report are based on desktop research, and consultations with experts and practitioners (SCI 
operators). The desktop research comprised internet research, but also a revision of related previous work in 
SmartResilience. For example, D1.3 “End users’ needs and requirements” was used to complete the results 
on internal influencing factors. In addition, a workshop with practitioners (project internal & external) was 
held1 to identify and discuss relevant issues, which was supplemented through surveys with practitioners. 
 
The target audience of this report is operators of SCIs who may be unfamiliar with how to identify possible 
obligations with regard to resilience that they may have. The case studies can help the reader to understand 
                                                                
1 SmartResilience workshop April 24-26, Budapest 
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what sort of regulations to look for in their respective countries. In addition, the chapter 4 on organizational 
setup and chapter 5 on ethics may raise awareness to some of the elements that may be overlooked when 
discussing resilience from a purely technical point of view. It thus assists in generating debate and 
highlighting potentially problematic developments early on. This might include highlighting simple issues, 
which can easily be changed with significant impacts on successful resilience assessments or actions to 
increase resilience. While some of the results of this deliverable are already available in abridged and 
adapted form in a first version of deliverable 3.6, which is the “Guideline for assessing, predicting and 
monitoring resilience of SCIs” (final version to be delivered May 2018), this deliverable provides more 
background information. 
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 Legal acts and supporting tools to assess and ensure resilience 
2.1 Legal acts on (S)CI resilience at EU-level  
There are different types of legal acts at EU level, which differ on how legally binding they are. The EU 
describes these different types of legal acts on its official website2 as follows: 
Regulations 
A "regulation" is a binding legislative act. It must be applied in its entirety across the EU. For example, when 
the EU wanted to make sure that there are common safeguards on goods imported from outside the EU, the 
Council adopted a regulation. 
Directives 
A "directive" is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. However, it is up to the 
individual countries to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals. One example is the EU consumer 
rights directive, which strengthens rights for consumers across the EU, for example by eliminating hidden 
charges and costs on the internet, and extending the period under which consumers can withdraw from a 
sales contract. 
Decisions 
A "decision" is binding on those to whom it is addressed (e.g. an EU country or an individual company) and is 
directly applicable. For example, the Commission issued a decision on the EU participating in the work of 
various counter-terrorism organisations. The decision related to these organisations only. 
Recommendations 
A "recommendation" is not binding. When the Commission issued a recommendation that EU countries' law 
authorities improve their use of videoconferencing to help judicial services work better across borders, this did 
not have any legal consequences. A recommendation allows the institutions to make their views known and to 
suggest a line of action without imposing any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed. 
Opinions 
An "opinion" is an instrument that allows the institutions to make a statement in a non-binding fashion, in 
other words without imposing any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed. An opinion is not 
binding. It can be issued by the main EU institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament), the Committee of the 
Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee. While laws are being made, the committees give 
opinions from their specific regional or economic and social viewpoint. For example, the Committee of the 
Regions issued an opinion on the clean air policy package for Europe. [38]  
Mainly addressed in this report are the binding Regulations and Directives. 
The EU’s official website further provides summaries of EU legislation, enabling a quick insight into specific 
legal acts.3 
 
                                                                
2 https://europa.eu/european-union/  
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/summaries.html?locale=en  
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Figure 1: EU Directive transposition into National laws 
 
Selected legal acts 
The European Programme for European Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) provides an overall frame 
for critical infrastructure protection (energy, transportation, and finance) in the EU. It focuses on the 
identification and assessment of critical infrastructure in the EU (established in Directive 2008/114/EC, see 
below), the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN), the funding for over 100 critical 
infrastructure protection projects, as well as international cooperation [33]. 
In the following, some directives and regulations are described that seem most relevant for SmartResilience. 
(However, the list cannot be comprehensive.) Some additional directives, plus a list of documents that 
address relevant topics but that are not binding, or only to a small extent (see above), are listed in Annex 1. 
Table 1 summarizes the identified relevant legal acts that are further described below. 
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Table 1:  Overview selected legal acts on EU level obliging stakeholders to assess/ increase resilience 
Legal act Relevant because 
CI stakeholders 
mainly affected 
Link 
Directive 2008/114/EC – 
identification and 
designation of European 
critical infrastructures and 
assessment of the need to 
improve their protection 
Member States are requested to identify 
important assets of critical 
infrastructures;  
Requests conduction of risk analysis and 
threat scenarios; 
Counter-measures and procedures shall 
be identified, selected and prioritized. 
From energy and 
transport sectors 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/en/TXT/?u
ri=CELEX:32008L01
14  
Directive 2013/40/EU – on 
attacks against 
information systems 
Aims to facilitate the prevention of 
offences in the area of attacks against 
information systems and therefore helps 
in keeping them resilient. 
 
Decision and policy 
makers who are 
responsible for the 
establishment and 
operation of the 
national/government
al CERTs (Computer 
Emergency Response 
Teams), and the 
national/government
al CERTs themselves 
[39] 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/ALL/?u
ri=CELEX%3A32013
L0040  
Directive (EU) 2016/1148 
of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 2016 
concerning measures for a 
high common level of 
security of network and 
information systems across 
the Union (NIS Directive) 
Entails a risk assessment plan to identify 
risks for security of networks and 
information systems: ‚security of 
networks’ is defined as the ability of 
network and information systems to 
resist any action that compromises the 
availability, authenticity, integrity or 
confidentiality of stored or transmitted 
or processed data or the related services 
offered by, or accessible via, those 
network and information systems. 
All operators of 
critical 
infrastructures 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/TXT/?u
ri=uriserv:OJ.L_.20
16.194.01.0001.01.
ENG&toc=OJ:L:201
6:194:TOC  
Directive 2005/89/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 
January 2006 concerning 
measures to safeguard 
security of electricity 
supply and infrastructure 
investment 
Relevant for the “smart” component of 
the project. Requirements for operators 
with regard to security and notification 
are established. 
From energy sector 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/TXT/?u
ri=celex:32005L00
89  
Directive 2000/60/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 
October 2000 establishing 
a framework for 
Community action in the 
field of water policy (Water 
Framework Directive) 
It directly addresses key tasks of water 
supply operators, and is also relevant for 
all other infrastructure operations that 
can affect water quality. Successive 
amendments have been incorporated in 
this Directive. 
From water supply 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/TXT/?u
ri=celex%3A32000
L0060  
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Legal act Relevant because 
CI stakeholders 
mainly affected 
Link 
Directive 2007/60/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 
October 2007 on the 
assessment and 
management of flood 
risks. 
Entails a preliminary assessment of flood 
risks as well as a risk assessment to 
reduce consequences. 
All operators of 
critical 
infrastructures prone 
to flood risks 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/TXT/?u
ri=celex:32007L00
60  
Directive 2012/18/EU of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on the control of 
major-accident hazards 
involving dangerous 
substances, amending and 
subsequently repealing 
Council Directive 96/82/EC 
(Seveso III Directive) 
Operators using dangerous substances 
are required to take all necessary 
measures to prevent major accidents. 
From Refinery sector 
and the ones 
dependent on it 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/TXT/?u
ri=celex%3A32012
L0018 
Regulation (EU) No 
994/2010 concerning 
measures to safeguard 
security of gas supply and 
repealing Council Directive 
2004/67/EC 
Aims to ensure both prevention and a 
coordinated response in the event of a 
supply disruption. 
From natural gas 
supply 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/TXT/?u
ri=celex:32010R09
94  
Regulation (EC) No 
300/2008 on common 
rules in the field of civil 
aviation security 
Lays down rules and basic standards on 
aviation security. 
From civil aviation 
sector 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal
-
content/EN/ALL/?u
ri=CELEX%3A32008
R0300  
 
Directive 2008/114/EC establishes a procedure for the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures (‘ECIs’), and a common approach to the assessment of the need to improve the protection of 
these infrastructures, in order to contribute to the protection of people. The Directive applies to the energy 
and transport sectors. Member States (MSs) must regularly review the identification of ECIs, and each ECI has 
to have an “operator security plan” in place. MSs have to conduct threat assessments and report the types of 
risks, threats and vulnerabilities every 2 years. Thus, it constitutes one of the basic legal acts in the context of 
SmartResilience. 
Directive 2013/40/EU – on attacks against information systems is relevant especially due to the “smart” 
character of CIs addressed in SmartResilience. It establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the area of attacks against information systems. It also aims to tackle such 
offences and to improve cooperation between judicial and other relevant authorities. The Directive 
introduces new rules harmonizing criminalization and penalties for a number of offences directed against 
information systems. It also calls for EU countries to use the same contact points used by the Council of 
Europe and the G8 to react rapidly to threats involving advanced technology. The main types of criminal 
offences covered by this Directive are attacks against information systems, ranging from denial of service 
attacks designed to bring down a server to interception of data and botnet attacks. 
Also Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS Directive) seems most relevant in the context of SmartResilience 
considering the “smart” component of the project. It prescribes measures to achieve a high common level of 
security of network and information systems within the Union so as to improve the functioning of the 
internal market. It also sets out obligations to all MSs to adopt a national strategy on these matters. The 
Directive creates a cooperation group as well as a computer security incident response network. 
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Requirements for operators with regard to security and notification are established. The Directive further 
lays down obligations for MSs to designate national authorities. 
Directive 2005/89/EC aims to ensure the proper functioning of the EU internal market for electricity. It 
requests from the MSs to define policies on security of electricity supply compatible with the requirements 
of a competitive single market for electricity. They shall thereby amongst others ensure continuity of 
electricity supplies, and continuously renew transmission and distribution networks to maintain 
performance. 
The EU Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC) defines responsibilities for national authorities, 
who amongst others have to designate authorities to manage river basins in line with EU rules, and monitor 
their status including the impact of human activity and an economic assessment of water use. Water 
deterioration shall be prevented, and protected areas that require special attention shall be registered. 
Successive amendments to the Directive have been incorporated in the original document. This includes the 
Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration; the Directive 
2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks; and the Directive 2008/105/EC on 
environmental quality standards in the field of water policy. 
Directive 2007/60/EC establishes a framework for the assessment and management of flood risks, which 
aims to reduce their adverse consequences for human health, the environment, cultural heritage and 
economic activity within affected communities. It is thus relevant for all CIs that are prone to flood events. 
The Directive prescribes a three-step procedure consisting of a preliminary flood risk assessment, a risk 
assessment and flood risk management plans. The flood risk management plans are not formally binding but 
measures are proposed to manage the risks and focus on prevention, protection and preparedness. 
The Seveso III Directive 2012/18/EU is based on a preventive principle that aims to anticipate possible 
(probable) negative effects from events involving dangerous substances and uses various instruments to 
avoid the occurrence of damage. It is achieved by focusing on ways to avoid transboundary pollution, 
prevent pollution at source, reduce environmental damage and reduce the risk of harm [26]. The Directive 
covers facilities where dangerous substances may be present (e.g. during processing or storage) in quantities 
above a certain threshold. Operators of the infrastructures are obliged to take all necessary measures to 
prevent major accidents and to limit their impact on human health and the environment. The requirements 
include [29]: 
- Notification of all concerned establishments (Article 7); 
- Deploying a major accident prevention policy (Article 8); 
- Gathering information about the domino effects (Article 9); 
- Producing a safety report for upper tier establishments (Article 10). This article specifically, focuses 
on indicators for monitoring performance; 
- Producing internal emergency plans for upper tier establishments (Article 12); 
- Providing information in case of accidents (Article 16). 
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 aims to ensure both prevention and a coordinated response in the event of a 
gas supply disruption, and to secure the proper and continuous functioning of the internal gas market. The 
regulation provides common standards at EU level. These standards state amongst others that in case of the 
event of a disruption of the single largest infrastructure, MSs must be able to satisfy total gas demand during 
a day of exceptional high gas demand. Further, risk assessment and respective preventive action- and 
emergency plans are requested. 
Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 lays down common rules and basic standards on aviation security and on 
procedures to monitor their implementation. It applies to all civil airports in the EU, as well as to air carriers 
and entities providing goods or services to or through these airports. It includes obligation for both Member 
States and on airports and operators. The latter are obliged to define and implement a security programme, 
and to ensure internal quality control. Successive amendments to the Regulation have been incorporated in 
the original document. This includes the Commission Regulation (EU) No 72/2010 laying down procedures for 
conducting Commission inspections in the field of aviation security; the Commission Regulation (EU) No 
1254/2009 setting criteria to allow Member States to derogate from the common basic standards on civil 
aviation security and to adopt alternative security measures; the Commission Regulation (EC) No 272/2009 
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supplementing the common basic standards on civil aviation security; and the Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic 
standards on aviation security. 
2.2 Case study: Energy supply in Germany  
This chapter analyses the current situation of the energy infrastructure in Germany with regard to what sort 
of regulations, guidelines, and support institutions pertain to resilience initiatives. Of course, this case study 
is necessarily dependent on the general political, legal and technological landscape in Germany. Yet, this 
overview might nevertheless be pertinent to other countries as it shows what actors are generally involved in 
securing energy infrastructure resilience. A similar analysis in other countries can thus draw on these insights 
and help in the early identification of relevant sources. In addition, the topical focus on the energy is 
interesting as it will highlight how elements of security and safety are intertwined in efforts to increase 
resilience. The chapter thus pays particular attention to safety regulations and supporting documentation 
and institutions. 
The chapter is divided into two subsections. The first will discuss relevant laws and regulations whereas the 
second provides an overview of national and international guidelines and organizations that directly address 
resilience of energy infrastructure.  
While this chapter focuses specifically on the energy infrastructure sector, a short discussion of overall 
critical infrastructure protection in Germany may prove useful. At the most general level, the national 
strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure (“KRITIS-Strategie”) [8] defines the goals and lays out the 
strategy for any policies at the federal level. Its guiding principles are a close cooperation between 
government and industry based on mutual trust. In addition, all efforts should be based on how appropriate 
and commensurable they are with regard to possible threats and the level of necessary protection. The 
overall goal is to increase protection by working towards prevention, reaction, and sustainability: All 
operators of (S)CI are to work on preventing any disruption of their services. These efforts are to include 
protection in combination with risk and crisis management, all of which shall be subject to continuous 
training. The response to any disruption should be strengthened by reducing any downtime of the 
infrastructure. All of the processes and improvements are to be revised continuously and lessons learned 
from disruptions of infrastructures in other countries included in these revisions. In addition, international 
efforts should be coordinated by developing common standards.  
In 2005, the federal government had already issued a basic guideline for critical infrastructure protection [6]. 
This publication analyses potential threats to (S)CIs and recommends structural, organizational, personal and 
technical protections, e.g. how to protect vulnerable areas against intrusions, how to conduct physical access 
controls, or  how to improve crisis management communication. In 2009, and revised in 2011, the 
government also provided a guideline for operators of CIs on how to conduct risk and crisis management [9]. 
Given the prominent role and potential vulnerability of IT-systems, the government has also issued specific 
guidelines for this issue. A publication from 2007 details how to implement the national plan for IT protection 
for critical infrastructures [7]. This plan initially involved the active cooperation of about 30 companies, which 
has subsequently increased to more than 150 companies and organizations. The results of this cooperation 
between government and industry can be found online where companies can also register to participate in 
the programme [14]. 
2.2.1 Legal acts  
Germany is a Federal Republic, which has legislation on both the federal as well as on state (Länder) level. 
The German constitution, the Basic Law, defines which thematic areas fall under the competence of the 
national, and which of the state legislation.  
Highest legal acts following the constitution are federal laws (“Bundesgesetze”). These are followed by legal 
decrees (“Rechtsverordnungen”), statutes (“Satzungen”), and general administrative provisions (“allgemeine 
Verwaltungsvorschriften”). Accordingly, these different levels of legal acts exist within the individual states as 
well. From the safety perspective, in Germany each state implements its own regulations. Furthermore, each 
organization implements the procedures which are rooted in technical guidelines outlined in chapter 2.2.2.1 
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to ensure safety of the infrastructure. Table 2 provides an overview of the relevant laws and regulations, 
which are discussed in detail below.  
Table 2:  Overview of selected legal acts in Germany obliging stakeholders to assess/ increase resilience 
Legal act Relevant because CI stakeholders mainly affected Link  
Gesetz über die 
Elektrizitäts- und 
Gasversorgung, July 07, 
2005 
Regulates the provision 
of electricity and gas. 
All gas and electricity providers 
https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/e
nwg_2005/gesamt.pdf  
Gesetz zur Sicherung der 
Energieversorgung, 
December 12, 1974; latest 
change on August 31, 
2015 
Designed to secure the 
provision of energy. 
All energy providers 
https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/ensig_1975/BJ
NR036810974.html  
Verordnung zum Schutz 
von 
Übertragungsnetzwerken, 
January 6, 2012; latest 
change on August 31, 
2015 
Regulates the 
protection of the 
transmission grid. 
Operators of transmission grids 
https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/_nschutzv/%C
3%9CNSchutzV.pdf  
Gesetz zur Erhöhung der 
Sicherheit 
informationstechnischer 
Systeme (IT-
Sicherheitsgesetz), July 
17, 2015 
Aims to increase IT 
security. 
Relevant to every organization 
that uses IT-based systems 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/D
E/Gesetzestexte/it-
sicherheitsgesetz.html  
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 
January 14, 2003 
 
Regulates the 
protection of data. 
Relevant to everyone who 
collects data 
https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bdsg_1990/BJ
NR029550990.html  
Betriebssicherheitsverord
nung, February 3, 2015; 
latest change on March 
29, 2017 
It aims to ensure good 
safety and healthy work 
conditions in Germany. 
All operators of critical 
infrastructures  
https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/betrsichv_201
5/BJNR004910015.html  
 
2.2.1.1 "Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung“ (Law on electricity and gas provision) 
At the most general level, the “Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung” (Law on electricity and gas 
provision) aims to provide a secure, cheap, customer-friendly, efficient and environmentally safe, grid-bound 
provision of energy and gas to the public, which increasingly relies on renewable energy. With regard to 
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resilience and security, paragraphs 11 to 16 of part 1 of the law (Regulation of the Network) mentions the 
duties of grid operators. In detail, these 6 paragraphs state the following: 
§11 Operating  power supply grids; 
§12 Duties of the operators of electricity power supply grids; 
§13 Responsibilities of operators of transmission grids for the energy system; 
§14 Duties of operators of distribution grids; 
§15 Duties of operators of long-distance line networks; 
§16 Responsibilities of operators of long-distance line networks for the energy system. 
In addition, part 6 (§ 49 – 53) of the law addresses the security and reliability of the energy provision. These 
paragraphs pertain to: 
 §49 Requirements for facilities; 
 §50 Use of stockpiles for securing energy provision; 
 §51 Monitoring the security of energy feed-in; 
 §51a Monitoring load management; 
 §52 Obligation to report disruptions of the energy feed-in; 
 §53 Call for bids for new energy capacities in the electricity sector. 
 
2.2.1.2 “Gesetz zur Sicherung der Energieversorgung” (Law on the security of energy supply) 
Related to the overall law on electricity and gas provision is the more specific Gesetz zur Sicherung der 
Energieversorgung (“Law on the security of energy supply”) from December 20, 1974, which was last 
amended by article 324 of the provision from August 31, 2015. Paragraph 1 of the law regulates energy 
supply security: 
In order to protect the vital supply of energy in the case of an emergency and disruption of service when the 
disruption cannot be overcome by market driven mechanisms, regulation can be put in place with regard to 
a. Production, transport, storage, distribution, dissemination, purpose, use, and price of oil and oil 
products as well as other solid, liquid and gaseous energy sources, electrical energy, and other 
energy (goods); 
b. Legal obligation to keep records, supporting documents, notification duties on the market 
processes described in section 1 and about volumes and prices as well as other market 
conditions of these goods and; 
c. Production, maintenance, distribution, connection and use of production materials of the 
market economy if these production materials serve the creation of electrical energy and gas, 
as well as the services and works of businesses for the maintenance, restoration, production 
and change of buildings and technical facilities that serve to supply electrical energy and gas.  
Vital functions also include the fulfilment of public services and international obligations.  
Subsequent paragraphs deal with international obligations, the enactment of regulations, the 
implementation of the law, and more specific elements, e.g. compensation for losses, or punishments in case 
violation of the law.  
 
2.2.1.3 "Verordnung zum Schutz von Übertragungsnetzen” (Regulation for the protection of the power 
transmission grid) 
The protection of the transmission grid is regulated in the “Verordnung zum Schutz von 
Übertragungsnetzen” (“Regulation for the protection of the power transmission grid”), which came into force 
on January 6, 2012, and was amended on August 31, 2015. The regulation serves to implement the EC 
directive 2008/114/EG. It contains 7 paragraphs: 
§ 1 Report by energy grid providers 
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a. All operators of transmission grids have to provide a report that explains whose disruption would 
impact on at least two members of the EU.  
b. The risk scenarios prepared by the German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance (BBK) in conjunction with the Federal Network Agency are to be used as basis for the risk 
assessment.  
§ 2 Definition of European critical facilities 
Within two months after the submission of the report, the Federal Network Agency will declare facilities 
as European critical facilities, i.e. facilities whose disruption have implications for several European 
countries.  
§ 3 Appointment of security manager 
a. Within two weeks of being declared a European critical facility, the operators have to announce the 
nomination of a security officer.  
b. The security officer acts as a point of contact and has to be able to provide information about the 
facilities’ security plan. 
§ 4 Development of security plans 
Within four weeks of being declared a European critical facility, the operator has to develop a security 
plan that includes the following information: 
a. Declaration of the European critical facility. 
b. Results of a risk assessment, which is based on risk scenarios mentioned in § 1 section 2, that 
discusses the weaknesses of the facility and the effects of its disruptions. 
c. Development and determination of rank of order of countermeasures and procedures; these have 
to differentiated according to  
• Permanent security measures, which includes information on 
o Technical measures; in particular early warning systems, access controls as well as 
protection and preventative measures, 
o Organizational measures, in particular plans for the case of emergency and crisis 
management, 
o Surveillance and inspection plans, 
o Communication, 
o Raising awareness and education, 
o Securing information systems, and 
• Transitory security measures that can be activated depending on the level of threat and risk.  
§ 5 Confirmation and inspection of security plan 
a. The security plan will be assessed by the Federal Network Agency after four weeks of its declaration. 
If the plan is in accordance with §4 the operator will receive an approval of the plan. If it fails to 
meet the requirement, the operator will be given a time limit to remedy the situation.  
b. In case the security officer fails to meet requirements set out in §3, section 2, the Federal Network 
Agency can request the operator to provide adequate training or announce a new officer.     
§ 6 Classification of sensitive information 
The Federal Network Agency decides which information, reports and security plans have to be classified.  
§ 7 Entry into force 
This regulation enters force on the day of its declaration.  
 
2.2.1.4 “Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme (IT -Sicherheitsgesetz)“ 
(Law to enhance the security of information systems)  
With regard to the protection of information systems of critical infrastructure, the “Gesetz zur Stärkung der 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik des Bundes” (Law for Strengthening the IT-Security of the Federation) 
was amended to become the “Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme (IT-
Sicherheitsgesetz)” (Law to enhance the security of information systems) in 2015 and now includes specific 
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provisions for CI. Paragraph 2 has been expanded to specify what facilities or parts thereof are indeed critical 
infrastructures. They include all facilities (1) in the sectors Energy, IT, Transport and Traffic, Health, Water, 
Food, Finance and Insurance, (2) which are important for providing public services and whose disruption 
would threaten public safety and security.  Paragraphs §8a through d then outline the duties of operators 
(§8a), nominate the national contact point (the “Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik”) and 
list its obligations (§8b), to whom the laws apply (e.g. small businesses are excluded from §8a and §8b) (§8c), 
and the regulation of what information can be accessed publicly (§8d). Paragraph §14 discusses provisions 
concerning fines. 
 
2.2.1.5 Betriebssicherheitsverordnung – BetrSichV: Verordnung über Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz 
bei der Verwendung von Arbeitsmittel (Regulation for health and safety at work)  
The regulation aims to ensure good safety and healthy work conditions in Germany. It defines requirements 
in terms of safety measures, the right choice and use of specific means of productions, requirements 
regarding manufacturing processes as well as personnel qualification and information. Additionally, it defines 
federal legal penalties regarding the use and management of means of production.  
Relevant paragraphs are summarized below:  
§11 special events, disturbances, accidents 
Here, the document describes requirements regarding special events, disturbances and accidents. This 
includes: (1) The duty for the employer to act immediately in case of some sort of “instability” and to re-
establish a normal and stable functioning of the concerned mean of production. (2) The possibility to rescue 
and medically treat people. (3) The communication and provision of information related to the specific 
incidents. (4) The obligation to employ qualified personnel for actions regarding point one and (5) the 
obligation to define and to properly signal areas of danger. 
§12 Briefing of employees 
This paragraph defines requirements regarding the briefing of personnel about possible dangers and 
adequate reactions, which includes oral briefing as well as written documents.  
§13 Cooperation between different employers  
In case of different employers involved (e.g. due to subcontracting) this paragraph defines the requirements 
of communication and cooperation of these regarding possible dangers and adequate reactions in case of 
incidents. 
§19 Duty to inform relevant government agencies  
This paragraph defines the cases in which an employer needs to inform relevant government agencies (all 
cases with deaths or major injuries). The employer has the obligation to provide additional information if 
asked for (especially the reason for the incident and its possible consequences). This duty to report is to help 
the relevant agency to react immediately (if required) or to improve the overall safety and resilience in the 
long run.     
In summary, these regulations can help to improve the resilience of a given SCI. There are several 
implications for SmartResilience and CI operators: §12 concerns phase two (Anticipate/prepare); §11 and 
§13 concern phase three (absorb/withstand) and phase four (respond/recover); §19 could help to improve 
the response/recover capacity (phase 4) and also to adapt and learn (phase 5) from an incident. 
 
2.2.2 Guidelines and support 
The following section contains information about a selected number of international and national 
guidelines that pertain to a variety of infrastructure systems. The guidelines were identified in 
discussions with topic experts and operators of energy infrastructures in Germany and EU countries.  
These guidelines are supplementary to those projects and guidelines that have provided the basis for the 
SmartResilience approach, which have been discussed in detail in D1.1 and in D1.2. Besides the discussion of 
other EU projects on resilience, there is specific information on guidelines and approaches by UNISDR, OECD, 
SmartResilience: Indicators for Smart Critical Infrastructures   
page 20 
Sm
ar
tR
es
ili
en
ce
_D
3
.1
_v
2
3
b
c3
10
7
2
0
17
 
and FEMA in D1.1 and other indicator based approaches to resilience and corresponding guidelines in D1.2. 
The following guidelines provide information about resilience in specific fields of critical infrastructure or 
describe interesting regional and local efforts to increase resilience. 
 
2.2.2.1 National (Germany) 
Technische Regeln für Betriebssicherheit (TRBS) 
The „technical guidelines for industrial safety“ (TRBS) are documents complementing the “BetrSichV”(see 
chapter 2.2.1.5). While implementing the TRBS, the operator should consider that the facility or infrastructure 
has “to be in compliance” with the requirements of the BetrSichV. The exact implementation is not legally 
binding, but in case of non-implementation, the operator has to prove that the “equivalent or better” measures 
are implemented in the infrastructure to ensure safety and resilience. More than 30 TRBS are currently (June 
2017) valid, but only some of them are likely to specifically affect critical infrastructures: This is the case for 
TRBS 2141 (Gefährdungen durch Dampf und Druck), TRBS 3146 (Ortsfeste Druckanlagen für Gase), TRBS2151 
(Gefährliche explosionsfähige Atmosphäre – Allgemeines). It is likely that all three TRBS are relevant for case 
study ECHO (refinery in the industrial zone) and HOTEL (energy supply). They are briefly summarized below: 
TRBS 2141 concerns dangers related to steam and pressure [41]. 
First, TRBS 2141 provide guidelines about the determination of danger. A determination of danger should be 
done by focusing on the following aspects: shock waves, flying parts and slapping ropes, which originate from 
explosions as well as dangers of suffocation, poisoning, burning and freezing which originate from leaking 
elements [41]. 
Secondly, TRBS 2141 is giving guidelines on the evaluation of danger. Dangers should be evaluated using  the 
following indicators: amount of stored energy, access of employees or third persons, location of the device 
(inside/outside of the facility), characteristics of the pressured elements, nature of the facility/device, technical 
condition of the facility/device, equipment of the facility/device, usage of the facility/device and damage 
mechanisms [41].  
Finally, the guideline comments on suitable measures to reduce danger: Measures should be based on the 
determination and evaluation of danger and should be initiated (in case of a critical situation) following a 
specific order: First technical measures, secondly organizational measures and third personnel measures. 
External influences (like weather) should be taken into account and it is necessary to comply with any other 
guidelines given by the manufacturer [41].   
TRBS 3146 concerns dangers related to facilities containing gas (as well as hydrogen cyanide) [43]. 
It defines areas/stages of possible dangers (installation, filling, storage, emptying, maintenance, quiesce i.e. 
pause or alter a device or application to achieve a consistent state, disassembly) which the owner of the facility 
should investigate and evaluate possible threats. Once the specific threats are identified, the owner should 
define appropriate measures to be taken in case of an emergency. In particular, these measures should aim to 
reduce the likelihood of a gas leak, limit the volume of gas leakage and ensure the safety and security of 
vulnerable individuals and objects in the vicinity [43].  
The document goes then into the details of the measures to be implemented: They are divided into nine 
categories [43]:   
1. Defining the hazard areas,  
2. General measures such as installation of leak proof facilities, 
3. Signaling units and emergency shut off systems,  
4. Requirements for pipes and valves for equipment that contain gas,  
5. Requirements for the setup(e.g. emergency exits, ban of traffic areas) of the facilities containing gas, 
6. Measures for buried facilities containing gas, 
7. Requirements for audit,  
8. Requirements for Operation of stationary facilities containing gas and  
9. Special security measure.   
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TRBS2151 concerns the identification and prevention of explosions [40]. According to §5 ArbSchG, every 
employer is legally bound to assess and identify such threats and to take appropriate measures to prevent any 
explosion.  TRBS2151 provides general guidelines for implementation and the aspects to assess include:  
1. The existence of inflammable substances 
2. The possible existence of explosive atmospheres by these substances 
3. The scale of the danger such atmospheres could reach  
4. Measures to contain such atmospheres (see 5 and 7) 
5. Possible alternative substances and way to eliminate the explosive atmosphere without danger 
6. If elimination is not possible the evaluation of probability and endurance of such an explosive 
atmosphere, possible ignition sources as well of possible effects of an explosion 
7. Measures to avoid the occurrence of explosive atmospheres, measures to avoid ignition of such 
atmospheres as well as measures to reduce the impact of explosions 
Once all these aspects are assessed, an integrated explosion protection plan has to be developed and 
implemented [40].  
To summarize, clearly the technical guidelines summarized above are of significant importance to the 
infrastructures such as a refinery in Pancevo or the energy supply system in Helsinki. Furthermore, these 
guidelines could help to improve the resilience of these infrastructures by means of understanding the risks 
(Phase 1) and preventing the threat scenarios by means of anticipating and planning (Phase 2) of the 
resilience cycle. 
 
DIN VDE 0105-100 
The DIN VDE 0105-100 standard discusses all safety related aspects of working on, with or near any facility or 
installation, either fixed or movable that produces electrical power. The generated electricity can range from 
extra-low voltage up to high voltage.  The norm lists all of the requirements that are necessary for the safe 
operation of these facilities and includes best practices for working in the proximity of these installations, e.g. 
construction work near cables and power lines. It covers all details, including terminology, personnel, 
operation, equipment and communication.  
 
2.2.2.2 International 
ISO Standards 
The entire ISO27k standards series pertains to “information technology – security techniques” and is thus 
highly relevant for any operator of an energy infrastructure. The standards range from terminology to 
implementation guidelines and risk management. Especially ISO 27001 is widely known, as it sets out the 
requirements for an information security management system (ISMS). “An ISMS is a systematic approach to 
managing sensitive company information so that it remains secure. It includes people, processes and IT 
systems by applying a risk management process” [53]. 
 
American Petroleum Institute 
“The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the only national trade association that represents all aspects of 
America’s oil and natural gas industry. Its 650 corporate members, from the largest major oil company to the 
smallest of independents, come from all segments of the industry. They are producers, refiners, suppliers, 
marketers, pipeline operators and marine transporters, as well as service and supply companies that support 
all segments of the industry” [1]. 
“For more than 85 years, API has led the development of petroleum and petrochemical equipment and 
operating standards. These represent the industry’s collective wisdom on everything from drill bits to 
environmental protection and embrace proven, sound engineering and operating practices and safe, 
interchangeable equipment and materials. API maintains 685 standards and recommended practices. Many 
have been incorporated into state and federal regulations; and increasingly, they’re also being adopted by 
the International Organization for Standardization, a global federation of more than 100 standards groups” 
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[1]. One section of its standards focusses on safety and fire protection [2]. Within this section a lot of 
guidelines are listed that discuss Security Risk Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical 
Industries as well as guidelines on fatigue management of personnel and many different diverse guidelines. 
Only a short description of these guidelines is given. 
In specific, API has two standards that might be useful to SmartResilience: Std 780: Security Risk Assessment 
Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries; RP 754: Process Safety Performance Indicators 
for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries. Also, API 581 [4] provides a list of indicators which are useful 
for assessment of resilience of CIs in SmartResilience [55]. 
API RP 780: Security Risk Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries 
API 780 provides a five step Security Risk Assessment (SRA) for the petroleum and petrochemical industries. 
It covers a wide range of security threats from theft to insider sabotage to terrorism. It can be used for both 
fixed and mobile applications. “A SRA is a systematic process that evaluates the likelihood that a given threat 
factor (e.g. activist, criminal, disgruntled insider, terrorist) will be successful in committing an intentional act 
(e.g. damage, theft) against an asset resulting in a negative consequence (e.g. loss of life, economic loss, or 
loss of continuity of operations). It can consider the potential severity of consequences and impacts to the 
facility or company itself, to the surrounding community, and on the supply chain.” [24] 
The five sequential steps of the SRA are as follows: 
“1) Characterization-Characterize the facility or operation to understand what critical assets need to be 
secured, their importance, and their infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies; 
2) Threat Assessment-Identify and characterize threats against those assets and evaluate the assets in terms 
of attractiveness of the targets to each threat and the consequences if they are damaged, compromised, or 
stolen. 
3) Vulnerability Assessment-Identify potential security vulnerabilities that enhance the probability that the 
threat will successfully accomplish the act. 
4) Risk Evaluation-Determine the risk represented by these events or conditions by determining the 
likelihood of a successful event and the maximum credible consequences of an event if it were to occur; rank 
the risk of the event occurring and, if it is determined to exceed risk guidelines, make recommendations for 
lowering the risk. 
5) Risk Treatment-Identify and evaluate risk mitigation options (both net risk reduction and benefit/cost 
analyses) and reassess risk to ensure adequate countermeasures are being applied. Evaluate the appropriate 
response capabilities for security events and the ability of the operation or facility to adjust its operations to 
meet its goals in recovering from the incident.” [24] 
API RP 754: Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries 
API 754 is a recommended practice (RP) particularly aimed at refineries and chemical industry, providing 
precise definitions and an indicator classification for benchmark purposes [102]. It identifies leading and 
lagging process safety indicators useful for driving performance improvement. A distinction is made between 
four types of process safety events (PSEs) which, in order of decreasing severity, are referred to as tier-1 to 
tier-4. These are linked to different kind of events, and corresponding indicators Figure 2.  
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Tier 1
LoPC events of 
greater 
consequences
Tier 2
LoPC events of lesser 
consequences
Tier 3
Challenges to safety systems
Tier 4
Operating discipline & management system 
performance indicators
 
Figure 2: Process safety indicator pyramid 
It is an important standard because it has been globally supported and adopted by the oil suppliers and 
integrated oil companies [50]. It was initially developed for the refining and petrochemical industries, but 
may also be applicable to other industries with operating systems and processes where loss of containment 
has the potential to cause harm, hence can be useful for more than one CI.  
In terms of its applicability of measuring resilience of the CI, this practice focuses on the understand risk and 
anticipate/prepare phase by means of leading indicators and also the adapt/learn phase by means of lagging 
indicators. 
Furthermore, API 581 provides a list of indicators such which can be adapted to measure the resilience of the 
CIs. Some of the indicators useful for the resilience assessment adapted from API581 are presented in Table 
3 
Table 3: Resilience Indicators adapted from API 581 [4] 
Nr. Reference Resilience Indicator   
1. API 581 Resilience policy documented and applied? 
2.  API 581 
Resilience-related responsibilities clearly 
defined? 
3. API 581 
Training for resilience management in 
place? 
4. API 581 
General & specific resilience training 
procedures exist? 
5. 
API 581 /ANL 
[78] 
Emergency control center designated & 
operational? 
6. 
API 581 & ANL 
[78] 
Personnel assigned to contact for 
emergency plan? 
7. 
API 581 /ANL 
[78] 
Incident investigation procedures include? 
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OECD 
In 1971, OECD established a programme to address chemical safety, focusing initially on chemical testing and 
assessment [54]. It was later expanded to address risk assessment and management, to the testing of certain 
high-production volume chemicals, and to account for the safety of pesticides, biocides, and products of 
biotechnology [54]. Following the Bhopal and Basel accidents, the OECD countries decided that the 
programme should also address the issues related to chemical accident prevention, preparedness, and 
response and set a new working group to manage these activities. The Working Group on Chemical Accidents 
has brought together OECD and non-OECD countries, as well as industry, unions, UN bodies, and 
nongovernmental organizations, to collaborate in addressing issues related to chemical accident prevention, 
preparedness, and response [54]. One element of its work was to develop the Guidance on Safety 
Performance Indicators (SPI). The OECD published the 2008 Guide on Developing Safety Performance 
Indicators in two versions: one for industry and one for public authorities and civic associations [102]. These 
documents, developed by a group of experts from the public and private sector, are based on ‘best practices’ 
of measuring safety performance [102]. 
The guideline consists of two primary components: 
- a step-by-step approach for developing SPI programmes; and 
- a menu of possible indicators which addresses the range of issues involved with chemical accident 
prevention, preparedness, and response. 
The Guidance sets out a seven-step process for creating an SPI programme [77], i.e.: 
- Step One: Establish the SPI team 
- Step Two: Identify the key issues of concern 
- Step Three: Define outcome indicator(s) and related metrics 
- Step Four: Define activities indicator(s) and related metrics 
- Step Five: Collect the data and report indicator results 
- Step Six: Act on findings from SPIs 
- Step Seven: Evaluate and refine SPIs 
STEP ONE
Establish the SPI Team
STEP TWO
Identifiy the key 
issues of concern
STEP THREE
Define Outcome 
Indicator(s) and 
related metrics
STEP FOUR
Define Activities 
Indicator(s) and 
related metrics
STEP FIVE
Collect the data 
and report 
indicator results
STEP SIX
Act on the findings from 
the Safety Performance 
Indicators
STEP SEVEN
Evaluate and refine
the Safety Performance 
Indicators
 
Figure 3: OECD’s seven-step process for creating an SPI Program [77] 
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This guideline also provides a list of possible safety outcome and activities performance indicators for the 
following topics [77]: 
• Prevention of accidents 
• Emergency preparedness 
• Response and follow-up to accidents 
Outcome indicators help in assessing if the safety-related actions (policies, program, procedures and practices) 
achieve their desired results [77]. Also, they show if the actions reduce the likelihood of an accident  and/or 
less adverse impact on human health, the environment and/or property from an accident. They are reactive, 
intended to measure the impact of actions that were taken to manage safety and are similar to what are called 
“lagging indicators” [77], for example, the number of incident resulting from the failure to manage change 
appropriately. Outcome indicators often measure change in safety performance over time, or failure of 
performance. Thus, outcome indicators tell you whether you have achieved a desired result (or when a desired 
safety result has failed). But, unlike activities indicators, they do not tell you why the result was achieved or 
why it was not [77]. 
Activities indicators help to identify whether CIs are undertaking measures required to decrease the risks (e.g., 
the types of policies, program, procedures and practices described in the Guiding Principles). These are 
proactive measures, and are similar to what are called “leading indicators” [77]. For example, is there a clear 
definition of a change (modification)? They often measure safety performance against a tolerance or threshold 
level that shows deviations from safety expectations at a specific point in time. When used in this way, activities 
indicators highlight the need for action when a threshold level is exceeded. Thus, activities indicators provide 
organizations with a means of checking, on a regular and systematic basis, whether they are implementing 
their priority actions in the way they were intended. They can help elaborate the reason for a result (e.g., 
measured by an outcome indicator) achievement or failure. 
From the perspective of CI operators, an SPI may allow to [54]: 
- assess whether it is implementing appropriate chemical safety programs and policies, 
- evaluate whether these programs and policies are achieving their desired objectives, and 
- help determine the extent to which such programs and policies are making a difference. 
This allows a CI to identify if there is appropriate emphasis on different aspects of safety management and 
provide insights on the need for setting priorities for future investment of resources [54]. It can also facilitate 
communication and cooperation with public authorities, other enterprises, and the local community. 
Clearly, this guideline and the possible outcome and activities SPIs can support the CIs resilience assessment 
in two phases of the resilience cycle i.e. plan/prepare and recover/respond. For the SCIs in SmartResilience 
project, it could be useful to consider these applicable SPIs to ensure safety of their critical infrastructure for 
any chemical accident prevention, preparedness, and response. 
 
Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 
The Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), provided process safety leading and lagging metrics with the 
metaphor “You don’t improve what you can’t measure”. CCPS was established in 1985 by the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) for the purpose of assisting industry in avoiding or mitigating 
catastrophic chemical accidents. It aims to achieve its purpose by developing and promoting the use of 
common metrics across the industry and around the world. Several corporate members around the world 
drive the activities of CCPS [17]. 
The CCPS programme is built on three types of metrics [17]: 
1. “Lagging” Metrics – a retrospective set of metrics based on incidents that meet the threshold of 
severity and should be reported as part of the industry-wide process safety metric [17] 
2. “Leading” Metrics – a forward looking or proactive set of metrics which indicate the performance of 
the key work processes, operating discipline, or layers of protection that prevent incidents [17] 
3. “Near Miss” and other internal Lagging Metrics – descriptions of less severe incidents (i.e., below 
the threshold for inclusion in the industry lagging metric), or unsafe conditions which activated one 
or more layers of protection. Although these events are actual events (i.e., a “lagging” metric), they 
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are generally considered to be a good indicator of conditions which could ultimately lead to a more 
severe incident [17] 
The programme recommends all companies to incorporate these three types of metrics into their internal 
process safety management system. Furthermore, it suggests a list of indicators such as number of incidents 
with (failed) risk assessment as a root cause; inspection, testing and maintenance activities completed on 
schedule; number of errors during simulation training; Number of drills conducted with local emergency 
responders etc.  
Table 4: Example of the CCPS indicators use for defining resilience indicators [55] 
Source 
Safety  
indicator 
Resilience 
indicator  
Details of the indicator Phase 
CCPS 
Number of 
incidents 
with (failed) 
risk 
assessment 
as a root 
cause of the 
incident 
Number of 
incidents 
with (failed) 
risk 
assessment 
as a root 
cause 
Are there incidents with (failed) risk assessment 
as a root caused recorded? 
What is the percentage of events with (failed) 
risk assessment as a root cause? 
 
High: less than equal to 39% of the events 
Medium: between 40-69% of the events 
Low: between 70-100% of the events 
No record 
Understand 
risk  
CCPS 
Percentage 
of sites that 
conducted 
a drill with 
local 
emergency 
responders 
during the 
year 
Number of 
drills 
conducted 
with local 
emergency 
responders 
 
Are the regular drills conducted with local 
emergency responders? 
How often the regular drills are conducted to 
evaluate and reinforce the emergency plan? 
 
High: once/ month 
Medium: once/ 6 months 
Low: once/ 1 year 
Never 
Anticipate/
Prepare 
CCPS 
Number of 
errors 
during 
simulation 
training 
Percentage 
of errors 
due to 
deficiency in 
simulation 
training? 
Are the errors due to deficiency in training 
recorded? 
What is the percentage of errors recorded in 
the simulator? 
 
High: less than 5% 
Medium: between 5-10% 
Low: more than 20% 
No record 
Anticipate/
Prepare 
 
This programme is of significance to those CIs in the SmartResilience project that deal with chemicals such as 
the NIS refinery. The process safety indicators once applied can provide significant insights on the resilience 
of the CI. Also, as stated earlier, according to [55] the preliminary results of the application of the 
SmartResilience methodology suggest that safety indicators suggested by CCPS can be useful for the first two 
phases of the resilience cycle. 
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International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) 
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) is the advocacy institution for the global 
upstream industry for oil and gas. Oil and gas continue to provide a significant proportion of the world’s 
growing energy demands for heat, light and transport. The members produce more than a third of the 
world’s oil and gas. They operate in all producing regions: the Americas, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, the 
Caspian, Asia and Australia. They aim to serve industry regulators as a global partner for improving safety, 
environmental and social performance. They also act as a uniquely upstream forum in which members 
identify and share knowledge and good practices to achieve improvements in health, safety, the 
environment, security and social responsibility [51]. 
Since 1985, the OGP has been reporting about the trends in safety in the oil and gas upstream industry 
(upstream industry means the part of the supply chain that works on crude oil extraction).  It is done by 
means of safety performance indicators such as number of fatalities, fatal accident rate, fatal incident rate, 
total recordable injury rate, lost time injury frequency, number of lost work days, number of restricted work 
day cases, etc. The submission of data is voluntary and is used for trend analysis, benchmarking and 
identification of areas and activities on which efforts should be focused to bring about general improvements 
in performance. These indicators and trend analysis data provides an understanding of the impact after an 
incident occurred, thereby giving insights on the response and recovery phase of the resilience cycle [51]. 
Furthermore, in 2011 the OGP report number 456 detailing the recommended practice (RP) on key 
performance indicators was issued by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) following 
the report 415 on asset integrity [50]. It acts as a companion to the report on asset integrity – a key to 
managing major incident risks and describes practical implementation of KPI system [50]. It refers to UK HSE 
guidelines, CCPS OECD and the ANSI/API RP754 [50]. OGP links leading indicator to preventive barriers and 
lagging indicator to de-escalating barriers [102]. For so-called critical barriers a combination of a leading and 
a lagging indicator is suggested to test the strength of the barrier.  
In the guidance, OGP aimed at: 
1. Identification of indicators that are reliable, clearly defined, and implementable across the upstream 
oil & gas industry.  
2. “Loss of primary containment (LOPC)” of hazardous material, which is the predominant cause of 
major process safety incidents in the oil and gas production industry [50]. These LOPC events occur 
when there is a failure in the prevention barriers of the system. In this context, “Recording the 
number of LOPC events or actual consequences where one or more barrier fail simultaneously – is a 
“lagging” indicator” [50]. Also, monitoring the strength of the barrier by measuring the company’s 
performance in maintaining robust risk controls – is a “leading indicator” [50].  
3. Furthermore, it suggests that the companies can become aware by looking at some indicators that 
provide both retrospective and forward-looking insights, for example “near misses” [50].  Analysis of 
near miss events provides information on the likelihood of an actual incident and also provides 
lagging information on barrier weaknesses. Investigating near misses can help in continuous 
improvement of asset integrity and process safety by identification of weaknesses and providing 
warnings of potential events. 
 
Table 5: Leading and lagging indicators [50] 
“Lagging” indicator. “Leading” indicator 
Recording the number of LOPC events or actual 
consequences where one or more barrier fail 
simultaneously – is a “lagging” indicator. 
Monitoring the strength of the barrier by 
measuring the company’s performance in 
maintaining robust risk controls – is a “leading” 
indicator. 
Retrospective in nature Forward-looking nature 
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Clearly, the recommended practice is applicable to the ECHO (Oil refinery, Serbia) and HOTEL (Energy supply, 
Finland) case studies in SmartResilience. It can also be applied to the BRAVO case study for electricity supply, 
where the leading and lagging indicators could be adapted for the analysis of retrospective and future 
events.  
2.3 Case study: Drinking water supply in Sweden 
This chapter uses drinking water supply as an example of how the legislative system in Sweden is designed 
and how it supports and advices the assessment and strengthening of resilience. The analysis further 
elucidates how end-users (in this case drinking water producers and distributors, that is, municipalities or 
their companies) adopt legislation and how it shapes their resilience efforts.  
2.3.1 Legal acts 
The Swedish legislative system can be described as decentralized, with a high degree of power delegated to 
governmental agencies. The parliament issues acts (Swedish ‘lag’) on certain issues, such as emergency 
management and drinking water supply that regulate how various actors should address related issues. The 
government, as mandated by the parliament, issues regulations (Swedish ‘förordning’) that outline the work 
of governmental agencies on various topics, such as emergency management. The agencies run certain 
activities and they regulate what others do, such as municipalities. Agencies are usually national and sectoral 
in scope but all counties also have county administrative boards that on a regional basis oversee, coordinate, 
support and follow up on a large number of issues on behalf of central agencies, including emergency 
management and drinking water supply. These agencies are mandated to issue rules (Swedish ‘föreskrift’). 
The municipalities are responsible for providing safe water to consumers that are connected to public 
distribution networks, covering around 90 percent of the population, whereas the rest has access to water 
through private wells. The regulatory framework encompasses raw water sources, water production and 
distribution.  
To identify relevant legislation, a number of searches were made. The Swedish Water and Wastewater 
Association (Svenskt Vatten/SWA) advice and guidelines listing various agencies and their roles for drinking 
water supply were used [88]. Also the Swedish National Food Agency advice for risk and vulnerability 
analysis, which lists relevant legislation and methods and their applicability, was used [59]. Further, relevant 
legislation from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) related to CI protection, emergency 
management, risk and vulnerability analysis, and information security was identified. In addition, legislation 
regarding security of certain objects, as regulated by the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen), was 
analysed. In the presentation below (Table 6 and the following description), focus is on the most relevant 
legislation. A more comprehensive overview is provided in Annex 2. 
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Table 6:  Overview of selected legal acts in Sweden obliging stakeholders to assess/ increase resilience 
Legal act Addressees 
Relevant 
because 
Stakeholders mainly 
affected 
Link Note 
Act on Municipal and 
County Council 
Measures prior to 
and during 
Extraordinary Events 
in Peacetime and 
during Periods of 
Heightened Alert 
(2006:544) 
Municipalities 
and 
counties/region
s 
Regulates the 
emergency and 
crisis 
management of 
drinking water 
producers and 
distributors 
Municipalities and 
counties/regions, as 
well as others 
involved 
https://www.riksd
agen.se/sv/dokum
ent-
lagar/dokument/s
vensk-
forfattningssamlin
g/lag-2006544-
om-kommuners-
och-
landstings_sfs-
2006-544  
 
Rule of  
municipalities’ risk 
and vulnerability 
analyses (MSBFS 
2015:5) 
Municipalities 
Regulates what 
municipalities 
should 
investigate and 
prepare for 
All of them 
https://www.msb.
se/externdata/rs/
15e78831-767b-
4714-9fa4-
3b4fd0df92a8.pdf  
Including 
definitions 
of terms, 
checklist/in
dicators 
and advice 
 
Rule about national 
agencies’ reporting of 
IT incidents (MSBFS 
2016:2) 
National 
agencies 
Regulates what 
agencies need 
to report to 
MSB 
A large number of 
agencies as listed in 
regulation 
(2015:1052) 
https://www.msb.
se/externdata/rs/f
21ae5f7-b655-
4462-a2e6-
9939b952a751.pd
f  
Includes 
advice 
 
Rule and advice for 
protection of certain 
objects, information 
and material 
(PMFS2015:3) 
Public agencies 
that run certain 
critical activities 
(need for 
protection 
against 
terrorism, 
espionage, 
sabotage and 
robbery) 
Regulates what 
objects need to 
be protected, 
such as drinking 
water 
production 
The military, 
municipalities, 
counties or to 
organizations 
otherwise in charge 
of these activities 
(referring to law 
2010:305) 
http://www.saker
hetspolisen.se/do
wnload/18.1beef5
fc14cb83963e7c8
b/143082638459
0/Sakerhetspolise
ns_foreskrifter_all
manna_rad_saker
hetsskydd.pdf  
Includes 
advice 
Act on protection of 
certain objects 
(2010:305) 
Public agencies 
that run certain 
critical activities 
(need for 
protection 
against 
terrorism, 
espionage, 
sabotage and 
robbery) 
The military, 
municipalities, 
counties or to 
organizations 
otherwise in 
charge of these 
activities 
https://www.riksda
gen.se/sv/dokumen
t-
lagar/dokument/sve
nsk-
forfattningssamling/
skyddslag-
2010305_sfs-2010-
305 
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Legal act Addressees 
Relevant 
because 
Stakeholders mainly 
affected 
Link Note 
Rule regarding 
measures to be taken 
in regard to sabotage 
and other damage to 
drinking water 
facilities (LIVSFS 
2008: 13) 
Municipalities 
Regulate what 
producers and 
suppliers need 
to take into 
account 
Those in charge for 
drinking water 
production and 
supply 
https://www.livs
medelsverket.se/g
lobalassets/om-
oss/lagstiftning/dr
icksvatten---
naturl-mineralv---
kallv/livsfs-2008-
13-kons.pdf  
The 
National 
Food 
Agency has 
separate 
guidelines 
for SLVFS 
2001:30 
and LIVSFS 
2008:13, 
encompassi
ng  a 158 
pages book 
Environmental code 
(1998:888) 
Chapter 7 
Public agencies 
– municipal or 
regional 
Stipulate the 
need to plan for 
and protect raw 
water sources 
Protecting raw  
water sources 
https://www.riksd
agen.se/sv/dokum
ent-
lagar/dokument/s
vensk-
forfattningssamlin
g/miljobalk-
1998808_sfs-
1998-808  
 
Food Act (2006:804) 
Public agencies 
– municipal or 
regional – as 
well as private 
enterprises 
Regulate the 
need to assess 
the need for 
critical supply of 
drinking water 
Municipalities e.g. 
as drinking water 
producers and 
suppliers 
http://www.riksda
gen.se/sv/dokume
nt-
lagar/dokument/s
vensk-
forfattningssamlin
g/livsmedelslag-
2006804_sfs-
2006-804  
 
Regulation on food 
(2006:813) 
Public agencies 
– municipal or 
regional – as 
well as private 
enterprises 
Regulate how to 
secure critical 
supply of 
drinking water 
Municipalities e.g. 
as drinking water 
producers and 
suppliers 
https://www.riksd
agen.se/sv/dokum
ent-
lagar/dokument/s
vensk-
forfattningssamlin
g/livsmedelsforor
dning-
2006813_sfs-
2006-813  
 
Rule on drinking 
water (SLVFS 2001: 
30) 
Municipalities 
Regulate how to 
assess safe 
drinking water 
Those in charge for 
drinking water 
production and 
supply 
https://www.livs
medelsverket.se/o
m-
oss/lagstiftning1/g
allande-
lagstiftning/slvfs-
200130  
Includes 30 
pages with 
detailed 
advice 
 
Overall emergency management legislation 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) supports and oversees municipal and regional government 
activities with respect to crisis and emergency management (CEM), covering measures taken before, during 
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and after an emergency or crisis. MSB also supports and oversees how other agencies with responsibilities 
for various critical infrastructures address issues of resilience in its different phases and dimensions. 
Moreover, MSB is responsible for issues of coordination, i.e. addressing interdependence and mutual 
support between agencies.  
MSB, as part of its assignment to oversee critical infrastructures and crisis and emergency management, 
regulate municipalities’ work to set up, review and revise their overall crisis and emergency management 
plans. This includes their preparedness according to act 2006: 544 and associated regulations (2006: 942, 
2015: 1052), that prescribe a risk and vulnerability analysis and a plan for managing extraordinary events, 
such as a crisis management committee, training programs and reporting schemes, responsibilities for 
supplying food including drinking water etc. The rule MSBFS 2015: 5 around risk and vulnerability analysis in 
municipalities further defines terms such as risk, critical dependencies, critical infrastructures (or activities), 
vulnerability and crisis preparedness. The actors involved need to identify safety-critical (socially relevant) 
businesses within their area of responsibility, to run those businesses, to coordinate and support as well as to 
follow-up, report and learn from their experiences. 
 
Security legislation 
Information and IT security falls under the regulation of national agencies reporting of IT-incidents 
(MSBFS2016:2) issued by the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) as well as under the regulation and 
advice of protection of certain objects, information and material (PMFS 2015:3) issued by Swedish Security 
Service (SÄPO). Today, water production facilities are all protected objects, falling under the Act on 
protection of certain objects (2010:305) and related regulation and rule (LIVSFS 2008: 13). These objects 
should be protected from unauthorized access and unauthorized description, such as photos or drawings. To 
protect them, one can use police, military forces or other assigned personnel [79]. Organizations falling 
under this legislation, such as municipalities, are required to investigate what data and what objects needs to 
be protected in order to uphold national security and protection against terrorism [80]. The regulation also 
includes the obligation for governmental agencies to report IT-incidents that have occurred in the 
information system. 
 
Regulatory requirements for drinking water resilience 
The Environmental Code (1988: 888) and related legislation prescribes the need to arrange water protection 
areas and a water provision plan. This legislation is crucial to ensure sufficient raw water supply of sufficient 
quality. 
The Food Act (2006:804) and related legislation (e.g. 2006:813) require producers to make a risk analysis to 
ensure sufficient barriers towards potential contamination. Water producers need to have equipment that 
enables a) warning against errors in pH-adjustment and disinfection, b) alarm for increased turbidity, c) a 
description of the water works and, d) an operational instruction. This legislation also prescribes measures to 
be taken to ensure distribution. A distribution system needs to be designed, maintained and served so as to 
ensure the required amount and quality when it reaches the consumers. Moreover, the responsible 
organization needs to ensure that unauthorized persons cannot access reservoirs, pump stations and the 
like.  
The National Food Agency (NFA) is the central actor in a system comprised of many other actors dealing with 
drinking water. NFA is only concerned with the quality of the water for drinking purposes. Other actors 
include municipalities and the county administrative boards. The emergency management rule SLVFS 
2001:30 prescribe risk analysis and preparedness for water producers and distributors. For example there is a 
need to set up, review and revise a) a risk and vulnerability analysis, b) an emergency plan, and c) a crisis 
management plan with routines for a number of disturbances (such as water borne infection, loss of electric 
power, major leakage, and contamination with oil or chemicals). 
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2.3.2 Guidelines and support 
To identify what and how elements shape the application of legislation, handbooks and advice were used 
from the  agencies and SWA as well as evaluations, research reports, as well as interviews carried out (in April 
2017) with representatives from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the SWA, the National Food 
Agency, the research program DRICKS on drinking water coordinated by Chalmers University of Technology 
and with the Northern Water Board (Kommunalförbundet Norrvatten), the drinking water producer.  
The indicators and checklists provided together with rules should be seen as part of the advice that 
government agencies are required to provide, as a means to improve compliance. Most of the time, the 
indicators are on a yes or no basis accompanied with a space for reflection. They are not designed to indicate 
performance levels for the actual issue being indicated, rather as guidance towards the addressees’ own 
work fulfilling legislative demands. Through posing questions on specific topics they provide food for 
thought, stressing what the regulators need to do. Taken as a whole, a large number of no-answers or yes-
answers will give a rough estimate of the status of a critical infrastructure or various dimensions of it, as a 
sort of resilience level. Moreover, governmental agencies as well as the Swedish Water and Wastewater 
Association provides additional guidance, training and arranges seminars and conferences. 
 
Table 7: Overview of selected support for increasing resilience in the drinking water sector, related to the 
legislation 
Legal act General advice 
Other written advice, 
including checklists, 
databases, web tools 
Training, conferences 
Act on Municipal and 
County Council 
Measures prior to and 
during Extraordinary 
Events in Peacetime 
and during Periods of 
Heightened Alert 
(2006:544) 
 
Action Plan for the 
Protection of Vital Societal 
Functions & Critical 
Infrastructure [69] (MSB) 
Systematic efforts to protect 
socially important business – 
Support for risk 
management, continuity 
management and to manage 
events (MSB) [73] 
 
Web support 
Various conferences and 
seminars 
Maps 
Statistics 
Major exercises 
Advice in terms of learning 
from events, how to conduct a 
systematic safety work, public 
procurement 
Rule of municipalities’ 
risk and vulnerability 
analyses (MSBFS 
2015:4) 
 
Include general 
advice 
Guide to Risk and 
Vulnerability Analysis (MSB) 
[67] 
See above 
Rule on drinking water 
(SLVFS 2001:30)  
 
Guidance for drinking 
water (NFA, 2014) 
Risk and vulnerability analysis 
for drinking water supply 
(National Food Agency) [60] 
 
Drinking water training – 
disinfection, hygiene, risk 
analysis 
Training for the 
(SWA) 
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Legal act General advice 
Other written advice, 
including checklists, 
databases, web tools 
Training, conferences 
Rule regarding 
measures to be taken 
in regard to sabotage 
and other damage to 
drinking water facilities 
(LIVSFS 2008: 13) 
 
Guidance for drinking 
water (NFA, 2014) 
Crisis Management for 
drinking water (National 
Food Agency) [62] 
Exercise handbook drinking 
water producers (National 
Food Agency) [63] 
Web based advice in case of 
an accident at a water source 
(National Food Agency) 
www.livsmedelsverket.se 
 
 
Rules and advice for 
protection of certain 
objects, information 
and material (PMFS 
2015:3) 
 
Include general 
advice 
 
 
Checklist for SCADA security 
(National Food Agency), 
www.livsmedelsverket.se 
Guidance to improved safety 
in industrial information and 
control systems (MSB) [94] 
 
Training course in information 
security (MSB) 
 
Increasing resilience: support provided 
In the following, focus is on a limited number of the resources mentioned above; resources that briefly 
describe the support provided in a number of areas that are most relevant to the production and distribution 
of safe drinking water in sufficient quantities.  The first part is on the support provided by MSB, followed by 
the Security Services and then the specific support provided by the National Food Agency, the County 
Administrative Boards and the Swedish Water and Wastewater Association. 
 
Overall emergency management support 
MSB has identified relevant legislation, sponsored R&D, produced guidance for various assignments and has 
developed a relevant training concept. MSB has developed a model for sectoral agencies (such as the 
National Food Agency) assignments with sectoral plans. MSB also, together with sectoral and regional 
agencies, report the experiences from major disturbances in a number of sectors, such as drinking water. 
MSB has several activities that support the implementation of related legislation: 
1. The agency has an activity relating to information security issues that aims to increase quality and 
measurability of indicators. Important topics include confidentiality, appropriateness, access, 
possibility to track disturbances and measurements that are well anchored among actors.  
2. MSB provides advice and training for both risk and vulnerability analysis and for information security 
issues. 
3. The agency supports and indicates interorganizational collaboration as a national resource in crisis 
and emergency management. 
 
In an action plan [69], MSB provides an overview of the emergency management policy arena in Sweden, 
outlining relevant policy areas, goals, actors and policy instruments (legislation, monetary incentives and 
knowledge management activities). The overall principles are a) that the same organizations that are 
responsible for a critical infrastructure in normal operations are also responsible for managing the 
infrastructure in crisis situations and b) that crisis preparedness and management needs to be integrated in 
existing management processes. Emergency preparedness should use a systematic perspective, 
encompassing the whole life cycle of events and all kinds of events. The agency suggests using ISO 31000 for 
risk management and ISO 22301 for continuity management. MSB has also developed a guide to risk and 
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vulnerability analyses [67] for both municipalities and county councils. In the guide, MSB has listed the most 
commonly used methods for risk analysis, both quantitative and qualitative. Some of them are listed in Table 
13 in Annex 2. 
In a handbook [73], MSB provides concepts, terminology, checklists, and standards for the different functions 
as well as how various components in the systematic work towards increased resilience are related to 
standards, regulations and rules (Regulation 2015: 1052, MSBFS 2015:3, 4 and 5) and indicators used to 
assess and stimulate their application. 
In cooperation with sectoral agencies, MSB has begun to develop a model with performance goals for various 
CIs, including drinking water supply [93].  The intention is that goals should stimulate actors to provide means 
to increase emergency preparedness. So far, the performance goals are vague and related to customer 
supply, not to production or distribution. 
➢ Taking measures to reduce the risk for major disturbances in drinking water supply 
➢ Those disturbances that do occur do not influence other CIs such as healthcare, sewage etc. 
➢ Minimum levels of supply for individuals 
In 2015, MSB suggested that the performance levels could be supplemented with “temperature meters”, 
which could be used for a continuous assessment and evaluation of different actors’ capacities and efforts in 
order to reach the performance levels [97]. For example: 
➢ If there is emergency water and how much in relation to users’ needs 
➢ The proportion of households who in case of a disturbance has received potable drinking water 
within 24 hours 
➢ The capacity for emergency water per person within the municipality 
It seems that the performance levels could be compared to the SmartResilience “issues”, and the 
“temperature meters” to indicators to be developed in SmartResilience. 
 
The drinking water sector 
In a handbook for risk and vulnerability analysis [60] the Food Agency has compiled advice and guidance for 
responsible bodies within drinking water production [65] as well as rules and methods for analysis and 
operational planning regarding water distribution. The methods include HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points), Water Safety Plans (WSP), risk and vulnerability analysis and security analysis. Moreover, the 
Food Agency has produced several brochures and handbooks that provide detailed advice for both risk and 
vulnerability analyses as well as emergency preparedness, emergency management and exercise. The Food 
Agency also publishes a climate adaptation handbook or drinking water producers, municipalities and county 
administrative boards regarding how to plan with regard to risks due to e.g. flooding. The agency provides 
emergency preparedness training. 
The Food Agency coordinates VAKA, the national water catastrophe group, composed of personnel from the 
areas of drinking water production, environmental protection, laboratories and rescue services. The group 
supports cities and regions that have or might have urgent problems with (safe) drinking water supply. A 
network of experts within and outside of agencies continually advice and train the members of the group. 
The Swedish Water & Wastewater Association (Svenskt Vatten, SWA) represents the interests of the 
municipalities in the whole field of municipal water and wastewater. The association’s work includes: 
➢ Compiling recommendations and guidelines for risk and vulnerability analysis for water protection 
areas, 
➢ Arrange seminars and courses, such as in Microbial Barrier Analysis, 
➢ Publish a journal, newsletter and reports, 
➢ Initiate and sponsor research and development within the field. 
The Swedish Water and Wastewater Association also compiles a database (VASS) related to the water utility 
sector. Using VASS, Bondelind et al. (2013) [13] developed performance indicators (PI) for water works, 
focusing on safe drinking water and present a method for evaluating drinking water safety.  
Moreover, SWA has utilized the VASS database to construct an index, the Sustainability Index, as a means to 
assess the long-term sustainability of the water production facilities, primarily focused on the projected 
needs due to challenges that arise from climate change. The Sustainability Index is an expert/research based 
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approach, aimed at supporting municipalities with their work to secure safe drinking water. The experts have 
been developing the indicators during several years and a large number of municipalities have used it from 
2014 onwards (124 municipalities participated in the survey for the Sustainability Index 2015).  
A high rating on the Sustainability Index requires a documented knowledge of vulnerabilities and strategies 
and plans to secure sustainability in a longer term. The indicators include: healthy and safe water; water 
quality; supply assurance; water and waste water planning; climate change adaptation and flooding safety; 
high customer satisfaction; communication; economizing with non-renewable resources; energy savings; 
environmental demands; water availability; water and waste water equipment status; operational stability 
and; personnel resources and competences. According to an expert at SWA, the Sustainability index is 
intended as a tool for the members to use in respect to politics: explaining why they get a poor record, 
arguing for the need to increase capacity etc. 
International guidelines and support documents are often taken into account and incorporated in the 
Swedish documents when found relevant. Since the quality of raw water source has historically been very 
good in Sweden and the load on the source relatively small, many of the problems faced by drinking water 
producers in other countries has not been an issue in Sweden. However, climate change and further 
urbanization may change this in the future. 
 
Table 8: Overview of selected risk assessment techniques for drinking water in Sweden, provided by SWA 
and the Food Agency 
Supporting 
method 
Type of method Source  Description Comment 
Microbial Barrier 
Assessment 
(MBA) 
 
 
Method to assess 
the hygienic 
safety of the 
drinking water 
(Bondelind et al., 2013) 
[13]  
 
A simplified method that 
makes it easy for water and 
wastewater operators to 
evaluate their drinking water 
safety level 
A good example of 
how to make user-
friendly indication 
techniques 
Quantitative 
Microbial Risk 
Assessment 
(QMRA)  
Tool used to 
assess 
microbiological 
risks 
www.dricks.chalmers.se 
Used by Swedish water 
treatment facilities 
In Sweden, normally, a 
combination of local data, 
data from literature and a 
calculation tool developed for 
Swedish water facilities 
(QMRA-tool) is used.  
Advocated by WHO, 
using combined data, 
including scientific 
data 
Microbiological 
Barrier Analysis 
(MBA) 
Tool used to 
assess 
microbiological 
risks 
www.svensktvatten.se    
Used by Swedish 
water treatment 
facilities 
Water Safety 
Plans (WSP) 
Work 
plan/Management 
system 
www.svensktvatten.se  
(Davison et al., 2005) 
[21] 
Developed by WHO 
Managing drinking-water 
quality from catchment to 
consumer 
Developed by 
international experts 
Written for 
practitioners 
HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis and 
Critical Control 
Point) 
Management 
system 
www.slv.se 
 (Swedish National Food 
Agency, 2007) 
Originally developed by NASA  
Well accepted within  the 
Food Industry 
Included in SLVFS 2001:30 
(Swedish drinking Water 
Rules) 
Useful to look at 
because of its 
inclusion into rules 
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Sustainability 
Index 
Assessment 
system 
www.svensktvatten.se  
 
 A survey directed to 
municipalities 
 
Designed by experts 
Using existing data 
A means to argue for 
investments and 
attention 
Climate 
adaptation 
handbook 
Handbook 
www.slv.se  
Swedish National Food 
Agency 
Guidance for how to plan for 
risks of flooding and 
contamination 
 
Written by experts 
For non-experts 
 
Support for security protection 
MSB has an assigned role to support and coordinate IT-security work and to clarify how actors should follow-
up, report and improve it. The Security Services has issued a guidance [82] related to legislation on 
protection against threats to national security, confidential information regarding national security and 
terrorism, see Act 2010:305 and related legislation. The legislation essentially aims to restrict unauthorized 
access. The guidance stresses the uncertainty and unpredictability of the causes and timing behind attempts 
to unauthorized access and therefore the need to focus preventive work on identifying and reducing 
vulnerabilities as well as continuously updating the actual threat scenarios. Thus, preparation requires an 
analysis of the probable ability and course of actions that a potential perpetrator might use and to establish a 
defence that is capable of withstanding these. The Security Services also provides personal advice regarding 
legislation; responsibilities as well as methods for security analysis, internal control, to increase security 
awareness and for personnel security screening. 
MSB, NFA and SWA are the main actors providing support to the drinking water producers and suppliers on 
how to comply with the regulations even though the regulation from Security Services also gives advice on 
how to treat information security. The support provided by MSB, SWA and NFA is distributed as guidance 
documents and handbooks on how to organize the information and IT-security work giving written advice on 
procedures and structures to ensure that all important aspects are covered. NFA and MSB also engage in and 
organize exercises as a manner of supporting and pushing the concerned organizations to improve in this 
area. 
The recommendations in these guides can be divided into categories handling organizational aspects, 
operating procedures and increasing technical system security. A majority of the recommendations are 
focused on precautionary actions. 
Concerning ICT-security the most extensive support document provided by the Swedish authorities is the 
Guide to Increased Security in Industrial Information and Control Systems published by MSB in 2010 [94]. It 
contains 17 recommendations mainly based on international guidelines, standards and instructions from 
organizations such as North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Each recommendation has a detailed description and the users are given further 
recommendations on how to work with all aspects within the recommendation as well as information on 
further reading.  
SWA has also distributed a checklist to assess the work with industrial control systems security. It was 
released in 2012 and has a lot of similarities with the document from MSB. By answering questions 
concerning 64 control system security related actions the user gains an overview of the security work status. 
In the document Crisis management for drinking water by NFA there is an entire section devoted to secure 
information giving advice on handling confidential information, security in office IT-systems and security in 
the industrial control system. It contains guidance on how to work with these issues and stresses the need 
for clear responsibility, requirements on procurements and to have standardised procedures and protocols 
for security when updating and restructuring the systems.  
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 External influencing factors (legal acts) on assessing and increasing 
resilience 
When assessing resilience or conducting measures to increase resilience, specific legal acts can influence the 
success of these actions. In specific, data protection rights are an important issue in all countries and can 
have crucial impact on the ability to collect data for assessing resilience.  
 
Data protection legislation 
Data protection legislation was also mentioned by SmartResilience practitioners regarding the question, 
which kind of legislation can be an obstacle for resilience assessments4. This includes confidentiality (e.g. 
assessment results cannot be shared with others), and freedom of information – for example, an energy 
provider who wants to collect data on energy consumption of households has to respect data protection 
regulations; or, if mass movements shall be monitored, the privacy rights of individuals have to be respected. 
Also (the avoidance of) classified information was mentioned as obstacle, when using data to assess 
resilience. 
Further, on a higher level, platforms, centers, etc. for critical infrastructure protection that imply extensive 
sharing of data (e.g. EU-wide), require careful consideration of data protection rules. For example, the EU-
FP7 project ECOSSIAN5, which aimed at an Operator Security Operation Centre, has elaborated on data 
protection issues in detail. 
 
On EU level, current legal framework of data protection is laid out in Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. 
Directive 95/46/EC seeks a balance between a high level of protection for the privacy of individuals and the 
free movement of personal data within the EU. It sets strict limits on the collection and use of personal data 
and demands that each Member State set up an independent national body responsible for the supervision 
of any activity linked to the processing of personal data. The Directive defines cases when data processing is 
lawful, including for example the cases that the data subject has unambiguously given his consent, or that 
processing is necessary, e.g. for the performance of a contract or for the performance of a task carried out in 
the public interest. When data is processed, this has to be done “fairly and lawfully”, and it is forbidden to 
process personal data revealing issues such as political opinions or sex life. Exemptions and restrictions to a 
data subject’s rights can exist in certain cases, e.g. in order to safeguard national security or the prosecution 
of criminal offences. Regarding the transfer of personal data from a Member State to a third country, the 
Directive defines respective cases when and how this is allowed or not [26].  
The full text (as well as a summary) is available on the EU’s official website [26]. 
Further, Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications of 12 July 2002 addresses the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic sector. It defines requirements for 
service providers to secure their services protecting personal data [27]. 
This legal framework of data protection is currently in a process of change: A comprehensive reform of data 
protection rules in the EU was proposed in January 2012 by the European Commission. It comprises a 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 – protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and the free movement of such data) and a Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/680 – protecting 
individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data by police and criminal justice authorities, and 
on the free movement of such data), which have entered into force in May 2016, while the Regulation shall 
apply from May 25, 2018, and the Directive is to be transposed into national law by the EU Member States by 
May 6, 2018. These new legal acts are a response to challenges from the digital age. They shall strengthen 
                                                                
4 SmartResilience workshop April 24-26, Budapest 
5 ECOSSIAN - European COntrol System Security Incident Analysis Network, June 2014 – May 2017, 
http://ecossian.eu/  
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citizens’ control over their personal data, and simplify the regulatory environment for business – and thus 
support the “Digital Single Market Strategy”, which the European Commission has prioritized [34]: 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), defines citizen’s rights such as an 
easier access to their data that is processed, or a “right to be forgotten”, i.e. the data shall be deleted when 
there is no longer a need to keep it. It further details rules for businesses, e.g. a guarantee that data 
protection safeguards are built into products and services from the earliest stage (innovation-friendly rules), 
or removal of notification obligations [31]. 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 aims to better protect individuals’ personal data when their data is being processed 
by police and criminal justice authorities. It also aims to improve cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
and cross-border crime in the EU by enabling police and criminal justice authorities in EU countries to more 
effectively exchange information necessary for investigations. It includes key points on how the data is to be 
collected and processed (e.g. “lawfully and fairly”, “adequate, relevant and not excessive”, or “appropriately 
secured”). EU countries shall define time limits for erasing the personal data. Further, national authorities 
must take technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security for personal data that is 
appropriate to the risk. Where data processing is automated, a number of respective measures must be put 
in place [32]. 
The new Regulation and Directive will repeal Directive 95/46/EC.  
The use of data is crucial to assess resilience, and to identify gaps that require an improvement of CI 
resilience. Looking at the resilience cycle and its phases (see e.g. D1.2), this would affect the phases 
“understand risk” and “prepare”. However, the identified gaps can belong to all phases of the resilience 
cycle. Hence, the availability of data is a crucial aspect for the resilience assessment and improvement of the 
CIs. Especially in cases of public infrastructures such as airports, where video surveillance is pertinent, the 
desired data basis can be restricted due to data protection regulation.  
The new regulatory tool GDPR both strengthens the control of citizens over their personal data and simplifies 
the regulation environment for business, in order to support the “Digital Single Market Strategy” [34]. These 
two aspects need a balancing act to be able to ensure the objective of both, the support of resilience, safety, 
security on the one side, and privacy, protection of individual data on the other side. The commercial use of 
data has to be regulated, requiring consent of individuals. However, to get the consent of the public at large, 
for safety and security assessments, is a difficult aspect to address. 
The EU-FP7 project CRISP6 for example, has attempted to address this issue by means of a “Security, Trust, 
Efficiency and Freedom infringement (S-T-E-Fi)” method [20]. It proposes certification as an instrument to 
address security-related and societal needs. The certification is based on conformity assessment, which aims 
at overcoming the market imperfections [57]. Advantages of conformity assessment include for example 
preservation of quality, avoidance of damage and injuries, and reduction of risks [105]. Furthermore, it 
fosters trust [105]. However, this solution is not without challenges of fragmented markets within the EU 
[105]. The GDPR has addressed the issue of data protection certification mechanism in its articles 42 and 43 
[34]. This could promote better compliance with legal obligations and promote transparency [20]. Similar 
instruments could bridge the gap between the individuals’ data protection and resilience efforts for safe and 
secure CIs.  
Regarding further effects of the (new) GDPR on the SmartResilience methodology, the case studies in WP5 
might reveal additional issues to be considered and addressed. These issues will be included in the update of 
the SmartResilience Guideline (D3.6). 
 
The German data protection law shall serve as an example for data protection legislation on national level:  
Basic element of German data protection law is the Federal Data Protection Act, which entered into force in 
1977, and has been updated several times since then. An update in 1990 included the right of individuals to 
decide on their personal data to be used, which means that it is up to each individual to determine what and 
                                                                
6 CRISP - Evaluation and Certification Schemes for Security Products, April 2014 – March 2017, http://crispproject.eu/  
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how much personal information he or she would like to reveal. In 2001, the Federal Data Protection Act was 
revised in line with Directive 95/46/EC facilitating the exchange of data within the European Community [46].  
Furthermore, on April 27, 2017 the German Federal Parliament adopted the new German Federal Data 
Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) (“new BDSG”) to replace the existing Federal Data Protection Act 
of 2003. The new BDSG intends to adapt the current German data protection law to the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will become effective on May 25, 2018. 
The Federal Data Protection Act is complemented by laws covering specific areas of data processing, such as 
the telecommunications industry and the activities of security authorities, and data protection laws on state 
(“Bundesländer”) level. Besides the EC Data Protection Directive, other international data protection 
provisions have been incorporated into German data protection law, such as the Council of Europe Data 
Protection Convention and Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Objective of the BDSG is “to protect the individuals against his/her right to privacy being impaired through 
the handling of his/her personal data” [46]. 
The act applies to the collection, processing and use of personal data by  
1. Public bodies of the Federation, 
2. Public bodies of the states in so far as data protection is not governed by state legislation and in so 
far as they 
a. execute federal law or, 
b. act as bodies of the judicature and are not dealing with administrative matters, 
3. Private bodies in so far as they process or use data by means of data processing systems or collect 
data for such systems, process or use data in or from non-automated filing systems or collect data 
for such systems, except where the collection, processing or use of such data is effected solely for 
personal or family activities [46]. 
The aspects from the act that are of consideration for SmartResilience are: 
▪ For a CI operator, it is mandatory to get the consent from the data subject (i.e. the individuals) 
before collecting, processing or using the data. 
▪ It states in Section 14 that the storage, modification or use of personal data shall be admissible 
where it is necessary for the performance of the duties of the controller, which can be a CI operator. 
In addition, clause 9 in this section states: “the data can be used if it is necessary for the conduct of 
scientific research, as long as the scientific merit of the research project substantially outweighs the 
interest of the data subject and when the research purpose cannot be attained by other means or 
thus can be attained only with disproportionate effort”.  
▪ The collection, storage, modification or transfer of personal data or their use by means of fulfilling 
one’s own business (commercial purpose) shall be admissible. This can be the case when the need 
arises to safeguard the justified interest of the controller (i.e. the CI operator) of the filing systems 
and there is no reason to assume that the data subject has an overriding legitimate interest in 
his/her data being excluded from processing or use.  
In general, the act protects the digital privacy of individual citizens, which may impede resilience assessment 
in real time if data about individuals is required. However, with the consent of the data subject or user, the 
data can be used for research and commercial purposes.  
 
The “technical and organizational checklist” (German “Checkliste Technische und organisatorische 
Maßnahmen nach §9 BDSG, Annexe 1-3 – TOM”) is one of three checklists which are used to evaluate the 
compliance with the BDSG. The checklists aim to implement and guarantee a good and legal data protection 
practice. Using these checklists, the appointed authority can evaluate the vulnerability of any specific facility 
regarding data protection. They can also be used in order to find ways for safety and resilience improvement.  
The “TOM-checklist” is attached to § 9 phrase 1 of the German federal data protection act (BDSG) [44] and is 
subdivided into 14 checklists, out of which three are seen relevant in this context. These checklists are 
regularly updated by the German “society for data protection and data security” (GDD e.V.) [67]. It follows a 
summary of these three checklists: 
a. Checklist: physical access control (Zutrittskontrolle) [67] 
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The checklist physical access control concerns the physical location of areas, buildings and rooms, as well 
as the physical access by persons to these facilities. It addresses several issues of which the following are 
relevant to SmartResilience: 
i. The possibilities to restrict physical access to specific areas, buildings or departments.  
ii. The possibility of physical separation of specific departments (server-rooms, IT-departments 
etc.).  
iii. The different possible weaknesses regarding physical entrance and their securitization (doors, 
windows, ventilation shafts, fire ladder etc.).  
iv. The different possibilities of closing and opening regulation (Who has the keys, where are the 
keys, do backup-keys exist etc.).  
v. Possible surveillance devices (audio video surveillance etc.).  
vi. Definition and recording of physical access control (visitor or customer management etc.).  
 
b. Checklist: entry control (Zugangskontrolle) [67] 
This protocol aims to prevent the (electronic) access to data systems by unauthorized persons. It 
includes the following points (most relevant points have been chosen):  
i. Password proceedings (minimal requirements, regular change, bios and boot passwords etc.). 
ii. Other authentication measures (biometrics, chip cards etc.). 
iii. Recording of login. 
iv. Encryption. 
v. Access from outside the intranet. 
vi. Access to the internet. 
vii. Used technology. 
viii. Firewall. 
ix. Use and frequency of penetration tests. 
x. Admins (Who are admins, How do they work etc.).    
 
c. Checklist: access control (Zugriffskontrolle) [67] 
This protocol aims to guarantee that personnel can only access data that they are authorized to use and 
to avoid unauthorized reading, use, or copying of data. The protocol includes following points (most 
relevant points have been chosen):  
i. Existence and application of a user access rights concept (concept, role attributions, differential 
access to data, applications, operational systems etc.).  
ii. Data carrier administration (which and how much data carrier exists, how they are 
administrated).  
iii. Data carrier destruction.  
iv. Rules regarding data copying.  
v. Bag search. 
vi. Control of external maintenance.  
Overall, the “TOM-checklists” provide detailed information on how to evaluate resilience and safety of SCIs 
regarding data protection. Furthermore, it helps to improve safety and resilience of the SCIs. The checklists 
have been developed based on known risks, safety concepts and experiences. Therefore, most of the points 
concern the second (anticipate/prepare) and third (absorb/withstand) phase, for example they are useful in 
order to be prepared for a wide range of possible incidents and helps the SCIs to be more robust. However, 
some of the content can also be useful in the fourth (recover/respond) and fifths (adapt/learn) phase, for 
example the recording of relevant information (possible surveillance devices; definition and recording of 
physical access control; recording of login or the use and frequency of penetration tests) can help to adapt 
and learn. 
 
Even though data protection seems to dominate external influencing factors on assessing and increasing 
resilience, a few other aspects need to be mentioned: 
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While environmental legislation can encompass obligations regarding the resilience of specific critical 
infrastructure (cf. chapter 2), it can also hinder actions intended to enhance resilience of specific critical 
infrastructure. For example, an infrastructure that is not resilient can have negative impacts on the 
environment such as water contamination, which environmental laws try to avoid. On the other hand, 
actions that are actually meant to avoid negative impacts on the functioning of infrastructure, and thus to 
increase resilience, can also implicate negative impacts on the environment. As an example, non-renewable 
energy sources might be more resilient regarding a secure energy supply also during specific hazards events, 
but do more harm to their environment. Thus, respective environmental legislation has to be considered. 
Environmental legislation has also been mentioned by SmartResilience end-user partners7 as being a possible 
hurdle when implementing actions to increase resilience. 
 
 
                                                                
7 SmartResilience workshop April 24-26, Budapest 
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 Internal influencing factors on assessing and increasing resilience 
(organizational requirements)  
The success of resilience assessments and/or the implementation of resilience measures strongly depend on 
factors and structures within an organization, which can be supportive or obstructive. 
The checklist in Table 9 does not claim to be exhaustive and most useful implications of its results can only be 
identified on a case by case basis. However, it can help to identify factors that can be improved in order to 
enhance the possibilities to successfully conduct resilience assessments and/or to successfully implement 
measures to increase resilience. 
Respective issues are partly also represented in specific resilience indicators (WP4). However, representing 
required context factors for successful resilience assessment and actions, those issues that were described 
by practitioners are listed here. They can be grouped into topics on “staff + work process”, “tools”, 
“cooperation”, and “others”. 
Table 9:  Overview influencing organizational structures 
Question If Yes, the positive effect can be Source 
Staff + work process 
Is there specialized staff and/ or even 
a dedicated unit within the 
organization? 
Dedicated place for knowledge, expertise, 
resources, and tools can ensure that the 
required resources are available 
SmartResilience T3.1 
workshop; Written feedback 
by SmartResilience End-User  
Is there any training for responsible 
staff members on  
▪ How to conduct resilience 
assessments? 
▪ How to report assessment 
results?  
▪ How to implement actions 
to increase resilience? 
Improved abilities to conduct resilience 
assessments and to implement actions to 
enhance resilience 
SmartResilience T3.1 
workshop; Written feedback 
by SmartResilience End-User  
Is there sufficient knowledge about 
realistic risks, criticality of 
infrastructure, and possible cascading 
effects? 
Improved awareness 
Written feedback by 
SmartResilience End-User 
Do responsible staff members have 
expertise in the application of 
indicators? 
Increased feasibility of resilience 
assessments  
D1.3/ case study ECHO, p.38 
Are resilience assessments integrated 
into company processes/ daily work? 
Enhanced possibilities for assessments D1.3/ case study HOTEL, p.54 
Tools 
Is there a useful Decision Support 
System in place? 
Improved abilities to implement actions to 
enhance resilience 
SmartResilience T3.1 
workshop 
Are clear, practical and easy to use 
methodologies for resilience 
assessments known and available? 
Improved abilities to conduct resilience 
assessments 
SmartResilience T3.1 
workshop; Written feedback 
by SmartResilience End-User  
Are specific guidelines for specific 
areas known and available) 
Improved abilities to implement actions to 
enhance resilience 
SmartResilience T3.1 
workshop  
Do the existent IT systems allow to 
efficiently extract required data for 
resilience assessments? 
Feasibility to gain relevant data without 
using too much time and man-power 
D1.3/ SWH, p.25 
Cooperation 
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Question If Yes, the positive effect can be Source 
Do confidentiality rules allow to share 
assessment results with other 
stakeholders 
Improved possibilities of learning from each 
other 
SmartResilience T3.1 
workshop  
Is the cooperation with other 
relevant stakeholders (e.g. police, fire 
brigade, armed forces) sufficiently in 
place? 
Improved motivation; improved abilities to 
implement actions to enhance resilience 
Written feedback by 
SmartResilience End-User  
Does any exchange of experiences 
with similar actors take place? 
Improved sharing of knowledge + increased 
motivation 
D1.3/ case study ECHO, p.39 
Others 
Can the resilience assessment be 
conducted without using sensitive 
data?  
Enhanced possibilities to use available data D1.3, p. 63,66 
Is the amount of available data 
manageable? 
Enhanced possibilities to select relevant 
data 
D1.3, p. 63,66 
 
 
Resilience assessment results included in regular reports of SCI operators 
If results of resilience assessments are included in regular report of an SCI operator, this can serve as an 
indication of resilience assessments integrated in the daily work of SCI operators is in how far assessments 
are included in regular reports of the organization. Results of respective information provided by SCI 
operators8 are summarized as follows. 
Operator 1: 
Resilience assessments are included in safety reports, which are reviewed once in 3 years. 
Operator 2: 
The “Major Emergency Management readiness” is appraised once in a year. 
Operator 3: 
The safety and security activities by clients are audited/ supervised once in a year by the operator, based on 
EU directives. 
Operator 4: 
Exercises are conducted, but a follow up leading to improvements is not undertaken. Looking at these 
exercises from the resilience perspective is seen as useful to address these issues. Thus, a regular system is 
not yet 100% developed, while real events are used to implement actions and assess improvements. 
Operator 5: 
Regular assessments are conducted, while TSM (“Technische Sicherheit Management”) certification and 
ISMS (Information Security Management System) certification are used as a basis. Further, a follow-up of 
exercises is planned, and assessments of real events take place. 
                                                                
8 SmartResilience workshop April 24-26, Budapest 
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 Ethical aspects of indicator-based resilience assessment  
5.1 Introduction - unintended consequences of a resilience indicator  
Unintended consequences caused by the application of resilience indicators can always occur and can hardly 
be anticipated. Nevertheless, some factors foster the chance of unintended consequences and, therefore, 
the knowledge of these factors raises awareness. Furthermore, taking into consideration the knowledge of 
different potential problems and having a continuing assessment / evaluation management cycle, the 
occurrence of unintended consequences can be reduced.  
These considerations do not guarantee the “absolute absence” of unintended consequences caused by the 
application of resilience indicators, but do limit the unexpected consequences and their negative impacts. 
The following recommendations help to identify unintended consequences and to preclude their impacts. 
The fusion of science and application bridges the gap of misunderstanding and increases the quality of the 
Smart Resilience research and the resilience indicators created. According to the ethical standard (protocol) 
of this project, this has to be addressed as an ethical demand. In fact, the quality of resilience indicators is a 
requirement of an appropriate ethical standard as well. The ethical standard of Smart Resilience mainly 
focuses on the prevention of ethical issues before they can have their unintended impact. Therefore, an 
unqualified set of resilience indicators and/or their unqualified application and assessment have to be 
prohibited.  
In this section, the different “dimensions of resilience indicator quality” are displayed and how they can 
influence the implications. All the factors introduced are unwanted and, consequently, threaten the values of 
knowledge [47]. This is not only because of the mere fact that incorrect data is taken for knowledge, but also 
for all  the consequences entailed and further actions related to this misjudgment. Goode and Hatt stated: 
“An ethic is more than a presence of a basic value or values. It is also an injunction to action” ([47], p.21). 
What does this mean for the project Smart Resilience? This quote implies that ethic consists of two major 
components: (1) the presence of common quality values and procedures (such as explained in the ethics 
protocol of Smart Resilience) and (2) the keeping of the values in all actions & phases of research. According 
the quote, the researchers of Smart Resilience strive for high quality in research practice. To apply this 
theoretical “demand of quality” a certain number of actions and research practices are required in context of 
indicator-based resilience assessment. In this section, the authors will discuss the great relevance of indicator 
problems, which can cause ethical issues. This implies not only the already mentioned dimension of the 
quality of resilience indicators, but also the inaccurate application or use of it. 
In section 5.2, the authors outline the benefits of resilience indicator research to introduce the positive 
effects of this methodology and introduce also negative side-effects. In section 5.3 diverse indicator 
problems are demonstrated as well as their ethical implications. The knowledge of these unintended ethical 
implications leads to a set of countermeasures (quality requirements) that are developed and explained at 
the end of this section. The quality requirements of resilience indicator assessment will help to reduce 
unintended indicator problems and prevent ethical implications.  
5.2 Benefits of resilience indicators 
Although, this section is focussing on ethical aspects and consequences caused by indicator-based resilience 
assessment, a short discourse of the benefits of resilience indicators shall increase the understanding of the 
use of this methodology, the understanding of the purpose of resilience indicators, and what they are 
describing. At the same time, the information about the benefits offers first insights of possible ethical 
concerns due to the methodology (“nature”) of building indicators.  
The benefits and negative ethical effects are linked in a combination of circumstances, which every user has 
to be aware of. Negative impacts of indicators narrow the benefits of indicators or even turn them into the 
opposite direction. However, the benefits of indicator-based resilience assessment are crucial for a better 
understanding of resilience. 
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As resilience can be characterized as a vague and multidimensional concept ([19], [81]), developing an 
indicator means creating “a measure for resilience [that] can be a step towards characterizing resilience in a 
particular context” ([81], p.4). In other words “creating an indicator” is an attempt to describe a “part of a 
complex system” in manner to derive conclusions about the status of this part; in this case, deriving a 
statement about the skill “resilience”. The main benefit is to make resilience measurable, therefore 
analyzable for developments, and further comparable among different risks but also as benchmark among 
different critical infrastructure. 
Another benefit of resilience indicators is to raise awareness about resilience in general and about which risk 
entities suffer a lack of resilience in particular (ibid). In context of e.g. urban areas and their critical 
infrastructures, this plays an important role due to the dependency of population on the services and 
products of critical infrastructure. The awareness and analysis of rather vulnerable parts are used to 
implement countermeasures and protect/mitigate disruptions. Therefore, current research allocates 
resources and knowledge to progress and to compare these to further research in future. The accomplished 
knowledge leads to improve or build resilience at best. In addition, this knowledge enables to monitor and 
evaluate performance, which is crucial to secure the social benefits for politics [81]. 
5.3 Factors of resilience indicator implication and their potential ethical implications 
In context of the briefly introduction of the benefits (for further information see D1.1, chapter 2.2 
Preliminary definition & concept of resilience), the potential problems arising with this methodology are 
discussed in the following section according three stages of the Smart Resilience research: 
I. 5.3.1 Pre-research phase (preparation phase): addressing all stakeholders involved in the Smart 
Resilience research project  
II. 5.3.2 Research phase: addressing all involved projects partners in the development of resilience 
indicators 
III. 5.3.3 Application phase of resilience indicators: addressing all users of resilience indicators 
In a last section 5.3.4 countermeasures are introduced to ensure the quality of resilience indicators and 
prevent misleading measurement of resilience causing severe ethical consequences by wrong basis of 
decisions. 
5.3.1 Pre research phase: Conflict of interests and intentions of a resilience indicator 
Scientific research is powered by a certain intention, usually depending on where it originates from, the 
research programme, involved partners and funding parties. In this sense, there is no objective research 
because already the choosing of the research scope implies a purpose and therefore a judgment of what is 
worth and what is not worth to be investigated [81].  
The agreed and conducted type of research has a direct influence on how resilience can and is being 
understood. With regard to ethical aspects, intentions of the research need to be reviewed iteratively to 
understand the research process with its stakeholders. A key question, which one has to be aware of, is: Who 
initiated a research project and who benefits from the research regarding resilience indicators? If there is a 
political background, the research should lead to the ideal of social benefits and a maximised benefit for the 
society. 
Additionally, the intention can also influence the process of creating a resilience indicator as well. Certain 
interests influence the availability of data sets, which are needed for the application of the resilience 
assessment. The researches can face two possible challenges: Firstly, data sets which are needed are hidden 
or inaccessible through mislead intentions. Secondly, the choice of data can be limited to certain interests 
and therefore influences the outcome of the research of resilience indicators. In the Smart Resilience project, 
different groups (of project partners) and therefore also different interests are coming together. Besides 
partners of academia, different research organizations, industrial partners and public bodies are working 
together on the research topic of smart resilience indicators. The expectations are concluded in nine case 
studies, which represent different critical infrastructures and the application and evaluation of smart 
resilience indicators in context of resilience decision making processes. Therefore, the interests (research 
goals) are described in a transparent manner. Nevertheless, the application of Smart Resilience developed 
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resilience indicators needs an open access to the data sets of the industrial partners. The success of the 
application will be dependent on the interests of the industrial partners, the availability of date, and the 
arrangement of the stress framework of the case studies. The amendment of partners in the project is an 
example of different incompatible interests. 
The above mentioned interest “to raise awareness” can also function as an intention of a resilience indicator. 
However, in this case it needs to be considered that awareness of resilience as a preventive function of 
endangerments can lead to not intended inverted effects. This is termed as iatrogenic potential or iatrogenic 
consequences in the sense that “a preventive technique actually harms treated subjects” ([56], p.114). This 
label is primarily used in the context of medicine or psychology; however, connections can be derived to the 
concept of resilience as well. Questions can be asked like: Does an increased awareness of resilience emerge 
emotions of fear and insecurity in the population? In different studies, Wurtzbacher researched the 
correlation between objective and subjective security. He found out that there is no explicit correlation, in 
many cases, the evaluation of objective and subjective security even does not lead to similar results [106]. 
Therefore, “resilience awareness” should be part of operators and decision makers of smart critical 
infrastructures, who know about the methodology and benefits. To publish resilience indicator values 
requires additional explanation for non-professionals.  
5.3.2 Research phase: Inaccurate resilience indicator methodology 
Ethical concerns can also arise due to an inaccurate developed indicator or a lack of quality (see section 0.). 
Ethical impacts might consist of unintended consequences such as a loss of time and money because 
resilience indicator research implies high efforts of resources. If an inaccurate resilience indicator is not 
recognized as an inaccurate one, it leads to misinterpretation of the real situation and the investigated 
subject. Depending on the users trust value of resilience indicators in the decision-making process, wrong 
measures can be implemented and lead to a wrong policy application with more unintended consequences. 
An inaccurate indicator can occur due to many reasons, such as complexity. Transferring a theoretical 
concept into an operational variable, an indicator, usually already implies simplifying the complexity of reality 
in order to make the subject measurable. This is especially the case with the concept of resilience as 
“resilience is inherently complex and with increasing complexity comes greater difficulties in establishing 
measures and interpreting results” ([81], p.13).  
It becomes even more complex and fuzzy, because there is no universally accepted definition of resilience. 
The findings and results of diverse research studies are often not comparable or the comparison limited. 
Research studies need to clarify their (used) definition of the resilience concept and justify their way of 
operationalizing resilience through an indicator to counteract misunderstandings and their unintended 
consequences. Prior and Hagmann ([81], p.15) propose three considerations from a policy perspective to 
gain clarity of the resilience concept in a research study: 
(1) A sound definition; 
(2) explicit policy linked to the definition; and 
(3) explicit articulation of scale and context. 
The intentions, which influence what is being investigated, have to be put aside during the research process. 
This means a resilience indicator has to show the characteristic of being researcher independent in the sense 
of research results not being influenced by a researcher’s preferences. Otherwise, research results are 
distorted by subjective preferences.  
An inaccurate resilience indicator can also emerge due to research limitations. On the one hand, there is the 
complexity of resilience; on the other hand external circumstances are framing the research process. 
“Achieving the right balance” of the complexity of resilience and the given resources for the investigation, is 
a challenge, which has to be addressed in a specific research design. Nevertheless, resilience and its 
complexity are difficult to measure that can cause diverse indexes of an indicator (multiple indicators) [15]. 
Another issue of operationalizing resilience is generalizability, also referred as external validity. This term 
refers to “the assumption that the research can be transferred to other business contexts and situations” 
([45], p.184). In general, research results depend on the specific context in which they were collected, so it is 
not possible to generalize them. To enable a higher degree of generalizability, researchers have to take care 
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to collect data in a most likely real context. This has to be considered as well as the fact that the constitution 
of resilience also “var(ies) dramatically between places and with respect to the events they are examined in 
relation to” ([81], p.14). As the concept of resilience is more understood as a dynamic process than a 
constitution with fixed features, measurement results can also differ at the same place over time. 
Consequently, a once accurate indicator measurement can turn into an inaccurate one through time and 
context differences. The degree of generalizability can be increased by the number of research replications 
conducted [22]. An example for a rather quick changing indicator is performance indicators of operating 
systems such as production lines. Due to different influencing factors (e.g. crisis event), these indicators can 
change quickly, while indicators about e.g. educational training of staff change rather slowly. 
The fundament of resilience research (and research in general) is the data set (information) that the indicator 
reveals/concludes. If a resilience indicator is based on wrong data sets, the indicator itself will be inaccurate 
consequently and further all the assessment based on the indicator (chain of failure). For that reason, 
credibility of the used information needs to be guaranteed. The credibility can be ensured by checking the 
data fundament for completeness, correctness, consistency and traceability. In this context, the UN list refers 
to the aspect of completeness as “the data should be complete and free of missing values” ([103], p.7), 
whereas correctness means the data is free from error or fault. The term of consistency describes the data of 
being free from contradictions or convention breaks. Traceability as a sub-criterion of credibility ensures the 
possibility to trace back the whole research process and to check on its trustworthiness. To gain a high 
quality of data, it is presupposed that data is available and suitable (see section 0).  
5.3.3 Application phase: No application possibility of the indicator  
It can also be the case that according to circumstances a developed resilience indicator is accurate, but no 
application is conducted. This occurs for instance when there is no current need of it or the user does not see 
any relevance of it. If a decision maker does not know about the indicators relevance, there will be no 
application of the indicator although it might be accurate and relevant.  
As a research study takes time to be executed, a future perspective has to be taken into account if the 
researched scope will remain crucial. The concept of resilience (e.g. in urban areas the increasing population 
numbers has become more and more relevant or certain threats like global warming or terrorisms [19]) has 
to be reflected in the manner of which aspects of resilience might be more urgent and therefore of more 
interest than others. This choice of relevance (prioritization) is part of all stakeholders dealing with resilience, 
such as research level (Smart Resilience), SCI operators or governmental agencies.  
In addition, an application is also disabled if a developed indicator cannot be used by others due to a lack of 
understanding. This can be the case if researchers did not present their developed resilience indicator in a 
comprehensive way, or if the needed competence of researchers is not provided.  
In a complex resilience system, there also might be no data available to execute the application of resilience 
indicators in such a way, that the results are sufficient. The missing data lead to a deconstruction of 
application possibilities. 
5.3.4 Research and Application phase: Countermeasures to avoid unqualified indicator -based 
resilience assessment 
In the following section, a set of countermeasures are provided to avoid the development of unqualified 
resilience indicators. “Unqualified” means in this context that the developed resilience indicators cause 
minor to major ethical consequences by the use in a smart critical infrastructure system. Although, the 
quality of research and its processes in Smart Resilience and in general are described in the Ethics Protocol, 
the following descriptions are focusing especially on indicator-based resilience assessment according to the 
project. 
The Smart Resilience project uses a multi-layer approach to combine separated indicators according to issues 
which are clustered in dimensions, resilience phases, threats, and the critical infrastructure system (see 
D3.2). The quality requirements presented in this section are necessary to avoid unintended ethical 
implications. Although, the indicator requirements are also termed as quality criteria, they function also as a 
guideline to check on. 
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The Figure 1 outlines a set of indicator requirements, which can be used to evaluate the quality of a 
resilience indicator in the phase of indicator development and/or indicator application. To some extent, the 
listed indicator requirements correspond to a list of the UN ([103], p.7). The authors added other relevant 
criteria due to the specific demands of addressing “resilience indicators” and structured them as an 
overview. With the help of this quality criteria catalogue, the above discussed potential indicator problems 
can be encountered within the three dimensions:  
(A) Intention of a resilience indicator, 
(B) inaccurate resilience indicator and 
(C) inapplicable resilience indicators. 
 
 
Figure 4: Quality criteria of resilience indicators (source: authors referring to [10]) 
The two dimensions of the intention behind a resilience indicator based research and inapplicable resilience 
indicators can be reviewed through the requirement of relevance. The authors define relevance by the sub-
criteria currency, social benefit, applicability and cost. Social benefit refers to the outlined dimension of 
intention, as it is the ideal of a social benefit deriving from research. As mentioned above the question has to 
be answered, who will profit from a research project and by whom it is financially supported? The criterion of 
cost of the research has to be seen in relation to the expected benefit of the strived findings.  
The two sub-criteria of relevance, applicability as “the characteristic […] to be directly useful in a given 
context” [25] and currency of the addressed research manner, help to ensure the effective utilization of a 
developed resilience indicator.  
The criterion of maintainability also enables to lengthen the usability of a resilience indicator. Maintainability 
is consisting of sensitivity, attainability and time-boundness. Sensitivity refers to the aspect that “indicators 
should be able to reflect small changes in the things that the actions intend to change” ([103], p.7). In 
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addition, the criterion of attainability as “the measurement of the indicator which should be achievable by 
the policy or project and thus should be sensitive to the improvements the project/policy wishes to achieve” 
(ibid.) allow a broader scope of application. As time-boundness comes along with any resilience indicator, the 
time interval needs to be appropriate and clearly stated [103].  
To avoid inapplicable resilience indicators due to a lack of understanding of a third party, usability has to be 
ensured by the criterion of convenience in context of the ease-of-use for others not involved of the research 
process. It is important that the data about a resilience indicator is comprehensive, consistent and concise. 
The description of a resilience indicator therefore needs to be expressed understandable, clearly and 
succinctly, free of contradiction and convention breaks. 
The third problematic dimension referring to inaccurate resilience indicators can be addressed by the criteria 
of objectivity, reliability, validity and credibility. Objectivity, reliability and validity are fundamental of every 
research and probably the best-known quality criteria in the literature. These three quality criteria are 
hierarchically arranged [23] as shown in Figure 4.  
Validity as the overall indicator requirement is preconditioned by objectivity and reliability. Validity can be 
defined “in a very general sense, that our propositions describe and explain the empirical world in a correct 
way; in a stricter sense: that they are free from random as well as systematic errors” ([92], p.22). This means 
in other words, the resilience indicator measures what it is supposed to measure. A distinction can be drawn 
between different types of validity. Objectivity and reliability as preconditions of validity ensure that research 
results are independent of the researcher and the research methods. An independence of research methods 
implies that the results are reproducible, stable and continued measurable. 
The basis for every research project is the current available data. If the data consists of inferior quality or is 
even inconsistent, the resilience indicator will be inaccurate and misleading. Therefore, to ensure credibility 
of the data sources the characteristics of traceability, correctness, completeness and consistency have to be 
provided.  
The listed quality criterion of comparability is not directly referring to one of the three dimensions of 
resilience indicator problems. Nevertheless, it is crucial for the progress in the field of resilience as it is 
defined by the UN as follows: “the indicator measurement should enable comparison over the different 
lifecycle stages of the policy or project as well as between different policies or projects” ([103], p.7). This 
criterion accelerates progress in research because outcomes of diverse research can be aligned, which 
generates a further understanding of the research matter. 
5.4 Guideline and support 
In the previous section 5, a range of indicator problems has been discussed as well as their ethical 
implications within the three dimensions: intention of the resilience research, inaccurate resilience indicator 
and the case of no application. The overall challenge of “misjudgment” causes consequences like wrong 
resilience policy. The separately outlined indicator problems constitute the diverse origins, from which this 
misjudgment arises. To avoid misjudgment of resilience indicators and ensure ethical standards, it is 
important to take potential indicator problems into account and to pursue a high quality of research. The 
quality of indicator-based resilience assessment can be enabled by indicator requirements. Indicator 
requirements serve as a basis of quality control, which should be followed to maintain the scientific character 
of a research process. Lastly, unintended consequences cannot all be predicted and/or prevented, 
nevertheless with the knowledge of potential indicator problems and indicator quality criteria, negative 
impacts of resilience indicator research can be reduced and limited. 
A brief abstract of these quality criteria are provided in a checklist, which have been included in a first version 
of the SmartResilience Guideline.  
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 Conclusion 
Contextual factors are manifold and it is challenging to identify those that are “most relevant”. Especially 
when considering the legal background, the amount of legal acts with its different types, different sources, 
different addressees, different sectors targeted, is huge. The goal was to provide an overview of the existing 
legal framework without claiming to be comprehensive. However, it can serve as starting point and especially 
invites stakeholders from other countries and other sectors to use the provided description as starting point 
and motivation to check their respective legal framework. 
Also the legal acts as “external influencing factors” on the assessment of resilience and/ or the 
implementation of measures to increase resilience might be extended, since the variety of possible measures 
is large. 
The “internal influencing factors”, i.e. the organizational requirements, are mainly based on experience by 
practitioners involved in SmartResilience. However, other stakeholders might have different experience, and 
other factors might be added to the ones described. 
Further, the described ethical considerations are seen as crucial for a valid resilience assessment, even 
though there is no overall rule on what to do if one or the other quality criterion is not fully met. It can only 
serve as basis for decision making – which indicators to take up, which not, and how to interpret the results. 
First results of this report have already been summarized and transferred to the first version of the D3.6 
“Guideline for assessing, predicting and monitoring resilience of SCIs”.  
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A N N E X E S 
Annex 1  Additional EU legal acts 
Annex 2  Additional legal acts in Sweden 
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Annex 1 Additional EU legal acts 
The following list of legal acts (Table 10) provides an overview on legal acts that have not been addressed in 
chapter 2.1, since they do not directly imply the described obligations, but still seem relevant in the context 
of resilience of SCI. 
Table 10:  Overview further legal acts on EU level not addressed in chapter 2.1  
Legal act CI Stakeholders mainly affected Link to the complete act 
Further Directives 
Directive on electricity 
production from renewable 
energy sources 2001/77/EC 
(superseded) 
From energy sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l27035  
Renewable energy directive 
2009/28/EC 
From energy sector 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/EN/uriserv:en0009  
Promotion of cogeneration 
based on a useful heat demand 
in the internal energy market 
(2004/8/EC CHP directive) 
From energy sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32004L0008  
Energy efficiency directive 
2012/27/EU 
From energy sector 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
L:2012:315:0001:0056:en:PDF  
Environmental impact 
assessment (Directive 
2011/92/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on the 
assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private 
projects on the environment) 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0092  
Strategic environmental 
assessment (Directive 
2001/42/EC) 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001L0042  
Implementation of a Scheme for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Allowance Trading Directive, 
amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC (Directive 2003/87/EC 
of 13 October 2003) 
From energy sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32003L0087  
Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorization and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) (EC) No 
1907/2006 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02006R1907-
20140410  
Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 
14 September 2009 imposing an 
obligation on Member States to 
maintain minimum stocks of 
crude oil and/or petroleum 
products 
From oil/ petroleum sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:en0006; 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32009L0119 
Decisions and Communications 
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Legal act CI Stakeholders mainly affected Link to the complete act 
Council and Commission 
Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, 
Euratom of 23 September 1997 
on the conclusion, by the 
European Communities, of the 
Energy Charter Treaty and the 
Energy Charter Protocol on 
energy efficiency and related 
environmental aspects 
From energy sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31998D0181  
Commission Decision 
1999/819/Euratom of 16 
November 1999 concerning the 
accession to the 1994 
Convention on Nuclear Safety by 
the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) 
From atomic energy sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31999D0819  
Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament of 
20 October 2004 – Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the 
fight against terrorism 
[COM(2004) 702 final – Not 
published in the Official Journal]. 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52004DC0702  
Communication from the 
Commission of 
12 December 2006 on a 
European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection 
[COM(2006) 786 final – Official 
Journal C 126 of 7.6.2007]. 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52006DC0786  
Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: 
European energy security 
strategy (COM(2014) 330 final 
of 28.5.2014). 
From energy sector 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52014DC0330  
Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament: 
Tackling crime in our digital age: 
establishing a European 
Cybercrime Centre (COM(2012) 
140 final of 28 March 2012). 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52012DC0140  
Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the 
Committee of the Regions: 
Towards a general policy on the 
fight against cyber crime 
(COM(2007) 267 final of 
22.5.2007) 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52007DC0267  
Communication on the EU 
Strategic Framework on Health 
and Safety at Work 2014-2020 
From all CI sectors 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:0332:FIN  
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Annex 2 Additional legal acts in Sweden 
The following list of legal acts (Table 11) and guidelines/ support (Table 12) as well as support/advice 
provided by MSB (Table 13) complement those further described in chapter 2.3. 
Table 11:  Overview of selected legal acts in Sweden obliging stakeholders to assess/increase resilience for 
the drinking water sector 
Legal act Addressees 
Stakeholders mainly 
affected 
Link to the complete act Note 
Act on 
Municipal and 
County Council 
Measures prior 
to and during 
Extraordinary 
Events in 
Peacetime and 
during Periods 
of Heightened 
Alert 
(2006:544) 
Municipalities 
and 
counties/regio
ns 
Municipalities and 
counties/regions, as well 
as others involved 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/doku
ment-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/lag-2006544-
om-kommuners-och-landstings_sfs-
2006-544 
 
Regulation 
about 
emergency 
preparedness 
and increased 
alert 
(2006:942) 
National 
agencies 
A large number of 
agencies charged with 
regulating critical 
infrastructures and those 
charged with running 
some critical activities 
such as the Police, the 
Military, Coast Guard, 
Customs etc.  
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokum
ent-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/forordning-
2006942-om-krisberedskap-och-
hojd_sfs-2006-942 
 
Regulation 
about crisis 
preparedness 
and measures 
to be taken by 
responsible 
agencies in 
times 
increased alert 
(2015:1052) 
National 
agencies 
A large number of 
agencies charged with 
regulating critical 
infrastructures and those 
charged with running 
some critical activities 
such as the Police, the 
Military, Coast Guard, 
Customs etc. 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/doku
ment-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/forordning-
20151052-om-krisberedskap-
och_sfs-2015-1052 
 
Regulation 
with 
instructions for 
MSB 
(2008:1002) 
MSB MSB and those affected 
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokum
ent-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/forordning-
20081002-med-instruktion-for_sfs-
2008-1002 
 
Rule about 
national 
agencies’ 
reporting of its 
incidents 
(MSBFS 
2016:2) 
National 
agencies 
A large number of 
agencies as listed in 
regulation (2015:1052) 
https://www.msb.se/externdata/rs/
f21ae5f7-b655-4462-a2e6-
9939b952a751.pdf 
Includes advice 
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Legal act Addressees 
Stakeholders mainly 
affected 
Link to the complete act Note 
Rule about 
national 
agencies’ 
information 
security 
(MSBFS 
2016:1) 
National 
agencies 
A large number of 
agencies as listed in 
regulation (2015:1052) 
https://www.msb.se/externdata/rs/
b74a7b16-36a5-4de8-8f15-
1297c37f1324.pdf 
Includes advice 
 
Rule of 
counties’ risk 
and 
vulnerability 
analyses 
(MSBFS 
2015:4) 
County 
councils/region
s 
All counties and regions 
https://www.msb.se/externdata/rs/
15e78831-767b-4714-9fa4-
3b4fd0df92a8.pdf 
Includes advice 
and 
checklist/indicat
ors 
 
Rule of  
municipalities’ 
risk and 
vulnerability 
analyses 
(MSBFS 
2015:5) 
Municipalities All of them 
https://www.msb.se/externdata/rs/
15e78831-767b-4714-9fa4-
3b4fd0df92a8.pdf 
Including 
definitions of 
terms, 
checklist/indicat
ors and advice 
 
Rule about 
national 
agencies’ risk 
and 
vulnerability 
analyses 
(MSBFS 
2016:7) 
National 
agencies 
A large number of 
agencies as listed in 
regulation (2015:1052) 
https://www.msb.se/externdata/rs/
2ef1b968-9b11-456e-bf99-
77caad87bd92.pdf 
Includes advice 
and 
checklist/indicat
ors 
 
Act on 
protection of 
certain objects 
(2010:305) 
Public agencies 
that run 
certain critical 
activities (need 
for protection 
against 
terrorism, 
espionage, 
sabotage and 
robbery) 
The military, 
municipalities, counties or 
to organizations 
otherwise in charge of 
these activities 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/doku
ment-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/skyddslag-
2010305_sfs-2010-305 
 
Regulation on 
protection of 
certain objects 
(1996:633) 
Public agencies 
that run 
certain critical 
activities (need 
for protection 
against 
terrorism, 
espionage, 
sabotage and 
robbery) 
The military, 
municipalities, counties or 
to organizations 
otherwise in charge of 
these activities (referring 
to law 2010:305) 
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokum
ent-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/sakerhetsskydd
sforordning-1996633_sfs-1996-633 
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Legal act Addressees 
Stakeholders mainly 
affected 
Link to the complete act Note 
Rule and 
advice for 
protection of 
certain objects, 
information 
and material 
(PMFS2015:3) 
Public agencies 
that run 
certain critical 
activities (need 
for protection 
against 
terrorism, 
espionage, 
sabotage and 
robbery) 
The military, 
municipalities, counties or 
to organizations 
otherwise in charge of 
these activities (referring 
to law 2010:305) 
http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/do
wnload/18.1beef5fc14cb83963e7c8
b/1430826384590/Sakerhetspolise
ns_foreskrifter_allmanna_rad_sake
rhetsskydd.pdf 
Includes advice 
Environmental 
code 
(1998:888) 
Chapter 7 
Public agencies 
– municipal or 
regional 
Protecting raw  water 
sources 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/doku
ment-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/miljobalk-
1998808_sfs-1998-808 
 
Act on generic 
water services 
(2006: 412) 
Municipalities  
To assure provision of 
water for larger 
settlements 
http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/
20060412.htm 
 
Regulation on 
governance of 
the quality of 
the water 
environment 
(2004: 660) 
EPA and water 
districts 
EPA and water districts 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/doku
ment-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/forordning-
2004660-om-forvaltning-av_sfs-
2004-660 
 
Rule and 
general advice 
about 
governance 
plans and 
program for 
measures for 
surface water 
(HVMFS 
2015:34) 
Municipalities 
and regions 
Municipalities and regions 
https://www.havochvatten.se/dow
nload/18.596b74d91518c04d18181
9b4/1450702376173/HVMFS+2015
-34-ev.pdf 
Includes advice 
Food Act 
(2006:804) 
Public agencies 
– municipal or 
regional – as 
well as private 
enterprises 
Municipalities e.g. as 
drinking water producers 
and suppliers 
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokum
ent-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/livsmedelslag-
2006804_sfs-2006-804 
 
Regulation on 
food 
(2006:813) 
Public agencies 
– municipal or 
regional – as 
well as private 
enterprises 
Municipalities e.g. as 
drinking water producers 
and suppliers 
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/doku
ment-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/livsmedelsforor
dning-2006813_sfs-2006-813 
 
Rule on 
drinking water 
(SLVFS 2001: 
30) 
Municipalities 
Those in charge for 
drinking water production 
and supply 
https://www.livsmedelsverket.se/o
m-oss/lagstiftning1/gallande-
lagstiftning/slvfs-200130 
Includes 30 
pages with 
detailed advice 
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Legal act Addressees 
Stakeholders mainly 
affected 
Link to the complete act Note 
Rule regarding 
measures to be 
taken in regard 
to sabotage 
and other 
damage to 
drinking water 
facilities 
(LIVSFS 2008: 
13) 
Municipalities 
Those in charge for 
drinking water production 
and supply 
https://www.livsmedelsverket.se/gl
obalassets/om-
oss/lagstiftning/dricksvatten---
naturl-mineralv---kallv/livsfs-2008-
13-kons.pdf 
The National 
Food Agency 
has separate 
guidelines for 
SLVFS 2001:30 
and LIVSFS 
2008:13, 
encompassing  
a 158 pages 
book 
 
Table 12: Overview of guidelines and support for implementing resilience regulations for the drinking water 
sector 
Legal act General advice 
Other written advice, including 
checklists, databases, web tools 
Training, 
conferences 
Investigatio
n and 
research 
Act on Municipal 
and County 
Council Measures 
prior to and 
during 
Extraordinary 
Events in 
Peacetime and 
during Periods of 
Heightened Alert 
(2006:544) 
 
Make an overall concept – about 
safety and security (MSB) [75] 
Action Plan for the Protection of Vital 
Societal Functions & Critical 
Infrastructure [69] (MSB) 
Process description to follow up on 
municipal emergency preparedness 
[72] (MSB) 
Guidance for socially important 
business. Identifying socially 
important business and critical 
dependencies as well as acceptable 
recess time (MSB) [71] 
Overall orientation for emergency 
preparedness (MSB) [70] 
Systematic efforts to protect socially 
important business – Support for risk 
management, continuity management 
and to manage events (MSB) [73] 
Practicing crisis management: a 
handbook in planning, conducting and 
evaluating exercises (MSB) [74] 
Web support 
Various conferences 
and seminars 
Maps 
Statistics 
Major exercises 
Advice in terms of 
learning from 
events, how to 
conduct a 
systematic safety 
work, public 
procurement 
National 
evaluation 
of risks and 
capacities 
(annually, 
MSB) 
Evaluation 
of specific 
events or 
projects 
(MSB) 
Rule of 
municipalities’ 
risk and 
vulnerability 
analyses (MSBFS 
2015:4) 
 
Include general 
advice 
Guide to Risk and Vulnerability 
Analysis (MSB) [67] 
See above See above 
SmartResilience: Indicators for Smart Critical Infrastructures   
page 64 
Sm
ar
tR
es
ili
en
ce
_D
3
.1
_v
2
3
b
c3
10
7
2
0
17
 
Legal act General advice 
Other written advice, including 
checklists, databases, web tools 
Training, 
conferences 
Investigatio
n and 
research 
Rule on drinking 
water (SLVFS 
2001:30)  
 
Guidance for 
drinking water 
(NFA, 2014) 
Information and advice to those 
responsible for drinking water 
(National Food Agency) [65] 
Advice and guidance for responsible 
persons within drinking water 
production (SWA)[89] 
Microbiological risks in drinking water 
distribution (SWA) [87] 
Guidance – drinking water (National 
Food Agency) [64] 
Risk and vulnerability analysis for 
drinking water supply (National Food 
Agency) [60] 
Planning for drinking water – our most 
important foodstuff (several agencies 
and organizations) [91] 
Drinking water 
training – 
disinfection, 
hygiene, risk 
analysis 
Training for the 
(SWA) 
Risk 
analysis 
from raw 
water to 
tap (SWA) 
Environmental 
Code, chapter 7 
on water 
protection areas 
 
 
General advice 
about water 
protection areas 
(NFS 2003: 16) 
Rule and general 
advice about 
governance plans 
and program for 
measures for 
surface water 
(HVMFS 2015:34) 
 
Water protection areas – Handbook 
2003:6 with general guidelines 
(EPA)[76] 
Several handbooks from SWA – risk 
analysis, rules, etc. 
 
 
 
 
Act on generic 
water services 
(2006: 412) 
Municipalities  
Brochure from the counties 
 
Links to other 
sources 
 
Rule regarding 
measures to be 
taken in regard 
to sabotage and 
other damage to 
drinking water 
facilities (LIVSFS 
2008: 13) 
 
Guidance for 
drinking water 
(NFA, 2014) 
Strategy in a water crisis with reserve 
water– to crisis management 
(National Food Agency) [61] 
Operational measures in a water crisis 
with reserve water – for emergency 
personnel (National Food Agency) [58] 
Crisis Management for drinking water 
(National Food Agency) [62] 
Exercise handbook drinking water 
producers (National Food Agency) [63] 
Web based advice in case of an 
accident at a water source (National 
Food Agency) 
www.livsmedelsverket.se 
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Legal act General advice 
Other written advice, including 
checklists, databases, web tools 
Training, 
conferences 
Investigatio
n and 
research 
Rules and advice 
for protection of 
certain objects, 
information and 
material (PMFS 
2015:3) 
 
Include general 
advice 
 
 
Checklist for SCADA security (National 
Food Agency), 
www.livsmedelsverket.se 
http://www.svensktvatten.se/vattentj
anster/dricksvatten/sakerhet-och-
krisberedskap/scada-sakerhet/ 
Advice and guidance on physical and 
technical protection for drinking water 
(SWA) [85] 
Safety handbook for drinking water 
producers (National Food Agency and 
SWA) [86] 
Guidance to improved safety in 
industrial information and control 
systems (MSB) [94] 
Security informed procurement 
(Security Services) [83] 
Guidance to security protection 
(Security Services)[82] 
Training course in 
information security 
(MSB) 
 
 
Table 13: Overview of advice and support related to risk analyses in Sweden, provided by MSB 
Supporting 
method 
Type of method Source  Description Comment 
MVA – 
multidimen
sional 
activity 
analysis 
Scenario-based 
method for 
analyzing the 
vulnerabilities and 
capabilities of 
organizations and 
activities 
MSB (2012) [67] : 
Guide to Risk and 
vulnerability 
analyses (pp. 62-63) 
Starting with actors own values and 
perspectives – using a risk analysis 
matrix (probability vs. consequence) – 
later developing into scenarios 
Finally, the scenarios are evaluated 
Useful as a means to 
discover what 
stakeholders find 
worth preserving 
Useful to outline and 
evaluate possible 
scenarios and what 
needs to be done 
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ROSA 
method 
Risk and 
vulnerability 
analysis 
MSB (2012)[67]: 
Guide to Risk and 
vulnerability 
analyses (pp 63-65) 
Focused on emergency management 
preparedness 
A risk management group is a specially 
constructed group that works with the 
risk management process. It is 
composed of representatives from 
different parts of the organization. The 
method also stresses that other work 
within the area should be included, that 
a continuous crisis management 
process is created, and that the work 
must be an integrated part of the 
actor’s normal activities. The purpose 
of the method is above all to assess the 
actor’s ability to manage an undesirable 
incident, as well as to provide a 
stimulus for work on crisis management 
issues. 
Three values for the vulnerabilities of a 
scenario: very good, good and poor 
Useful to assess 
actors’ capabilities 
Useful as input how 
to assess users’ needs 
for T1.3 
Can be adapted to 
specific 
circumstances, easy 
to use 
IBERO 
method 
Instrument for 
preparedness 
evaluation of area 
responsibility 
MSB (2012) [67]: 
Guide to Risk and 
vulnerability 
analyses (pp 65-66) 
The tool is scenario-based and supports 
the actors with area responsibilities in 
their work on analyzing the ability to 
withstand and manage undesirable 
incidents, as well as review the 
consequences of the incidents. The tool 
is also IT-based and can store a large 
amount of information from various 
actors. It also supports communication 
between actors.  
Allows for evaluation 
of individual 
organizations as well 
as for several actors 
regarding the same 
incident – thus 
relevant for analyzing 
shared capacity or 
the effects of 
resilience to 
cascading effects 
Visualize effects of an 
incident to actors and 
to society 
 
 
 
